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SOCIAL ANXIETIES AND HUMAN CONFLICTS
Walter Weisskopf 338

AMERICAN SOCIALISTS: WHAT NOW? *Daniel Bell* 345

LABOR AND STATE IN AMERICA: NEW DEPARTURE *Alfred Braunthal* 354

BOLSHEVISM *Boris Sapir* 365

THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE AND THE "LOST PEACE" — IN LITERATURE
Vera Alexandrova 372

EDUCATIONAL TRENDS IN ITALY *Lamberto Borghi* 380

THE SOVIET PARTISANS AND THE JEWS
Solomon M. Schwarz 387

POLAND: THE BETRAYED ALLY *Boris Dvinov* 401

GREECE: LEGEND AND REALITY *Manolis Korakas* 408

WRITERS IN THIS ISSUE (Back Inside Cover)

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SOCIAL ANXIETIES AND HUMAN CONFLICTS

By Walter Weisskopf

Freud once stated that mankind has suffered three great disillusionments: first, when Copernicus showed that the earth is not the center of the universe but only a microcosmic speck in a cosmos of unimaginable dimensions; second when Darwin stated that man is not the crown of creation but is linked in an evolutionary chain with lower species and shares their unextinguishable animal nature; third, when psychoanalysis demonstrated that man is not even master of his own mind and that the "why" of his actions is a factor often beyond his conscious, rational will. One may consider the recognition of evil as an essential and integral part of human nature as a disappointment of similar importance.

Until the eighteenth century, evil was a recognized element of the picture which mankind had of itself and the universe. Christian thought considered man as involved in evil through original sin and life was even a continuous struggle to atone for its consequences. By assigning to sin and evil a well-defined place Christian belief lightened the load imposed upon the individual conscience. Any system of ideas which gives evil a legitimate place, performs not only an interpretational but also an emotionally cathartic function. By teaching people that evil has been brought into this world by the devil, or ultimately by God, since he created the universe including the devil, and by teaching that all earthly existence is sinful, the responsibility is shifted to factors outside and beyond the control of the individual. This alleviates the individual's anxiety caused by bad thoughts and bad deeds. The sinner thus receives a place in the cosmological hierarchy.

With the secularization and dilution of Christian thought and its replacement by a "scientific" outlook on life these protective projections against excessive anxieties and against feelings of guilt have evaporated. In our thinking these projections are replaced by the sociological and psychological "explanations" of evil. If all evil behavior can be traced back to historical and environmental conditions and to hereditary factors, it also reduces individual responsibility. The criminal can blame society, or his parents, for his actions. Psychoanalysis performs a similar service.

If we can blame our Id, our unconscious mind for our socially and morally disapproved instincts, wishes, drives, and actions, we can acquit our conscious personality of much of its responsibility.*

Even while we try to make society, environment, hereditary factors responsible for our misdeeds, we go on believing in the perfectibility of these conditions. Thus, evil is transformed from an intrinsic characteristic of human nature into a temporary imperfection which, we believe, can be eliminated altogether by changing the outside world. The apparently unshakeable belief in "progress" leads us to conclude that evil can be and is eradicated by improvement of our institutions.

Eliminating Evil by Social Reform

Contemporary faith in the progressive elimination of evil by social reform is different from the eschatological belief in the empire of heaven during the Christian era. Then one believed in a radical, qualitative, antithetic cataclysm of a purifying nature which would change human character and conditions of human existence in their very foundations. The belief in progress towards a better and perfect world as cherished by our civilization, implies no cataclysmic radical and fundamental change of an eschatological nature. Our belief is based upon the idea of evolution towards a perfect mode of existence. If one believes in a gradual, progressive evolution of humanity towards a better world, one also has to believe that evil is something extraneous, something foreign to human nature, something like growing pains which can be overcome gradually in the process of maturation.

In view of these attitudes it is not surprising that mankind is in a state of profound disappointment and disillusionment. Historical experience can but lead to the conclusion that evil and aggression are essential human character traits. No ideology, however sublime and elevated its striving, has ever prevented the manifestation of evil. On the contrary, it seems as if all idealism must, of necessity, pass into its opposite. Christianity represents to us the highest stage of humanization and spiritualization of life, the highest development away from the

* The fact that in this way scientific, explanatory, cognitive systems (like sociology and psychoanalysis) serve also as projective and defensive mechanism for the alleviation of fear, anxiety, and guilt does not in the least impair their explanatory value. The findings of these systems may be "true" in the sense of being verifiable as well as revealing causal relationships; they serve, at the same time, as an interpretation of "reality" and as a means of alleviating anxiety through the shift of responsibility to outside factors. Tout comprendre est tout pardonner.

natural and animal stage. Yet when Christianity crystallized into reality and created institutional forms and practices, it brought about untold sufferings, persecutions, discriminations, aggressions, and intolerance.

The far-reaching revolutionary changes which inaugurated the beginning of our era may have temporarily raised the hope that the development of capitalistic rationality, democracy, technology, and science would initiate a period of continuous development towards a better world. This belief, alas, has been shattered and cruel awakening has taken its place for those who have enough courage to face realities. The grandiose technological advances of capitalistic mass production which promised to banish need, want and hunger from the earth, have accomplished this only for selected groups and nations, and only at the expense of security and spiritual and material peace. The great socialist dream in which a large part of modern mankind had put its hope, has not been realized except in the form of totalitarian oppression or for the sake of war and destruction. However, one could maintain that these modern institutional developments are open to a different interpretation. But there is only one possible interpretation for the stark reality of war, sadism, hate, discrimination, destruction, and crime during the last thirty years. Evil is and always has been rampant on earth. It is known to all societies and to all institutions. It does not look as if it were the product of any particular type of political, economic or social organization.

Evil Through the Ages

One may try to explain the Nazi atrocities in Belsen, Dachau, and Buchenwald as based in the specific national character of the German people. (Emotionally, and from my own personal experience, I would be inclined to accept such theories). But these theories do not tally with the facts. All through history nations and their armies have perpetrated similar crimes, cruelties, atrocities and destruction. I do not overlook the difference that in Nazi-Germany those evil doings were considered legitimate, permitted and sanctioned by the political system. It seems, however, as if this represents only a difference in the degree of inhibition. All armies of all countries always have looted, raped, killed innocents and committed similar misdeeds. In our time all warring nations have indiscriminately bombed civilians, women and children. And the most peace-minded, highly civilized United States launched the

most cruel weapon of extinction without previous direct and explicit warning. It may be that we feel, at least unconsciously, guilty for these evil deeds of war. The unconscious mind does not need any direct, rational, causal relationship between events and individual action to experience a feeling of responsibility. Certainly, the majority of Americans do not consciously acknowledge any responsibility for Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nevertheless, the inherent evilness of human nature, the desire for destruction, for murder and killing which every human being unconsciously harbors within himself, connects these emotions involuntarily with these collective actions of destructions. We amalgamate our individual guilt feeling with those caused by our collective behavior.

The conscious or unconscious recognition of our evil-doings during the war causes an intensive feeling of lowered self-esteem and a strong feeling of guilt. They are the more intensive because our system of thought and ideas does not provide us with an ideological refuge against such experiences. If we still believed in the original sin and the fundamental wickedness of man, the materialization of such wickedness would not shake us so, would not call forth such intense (although unconscious) selfcontempt. However such evil as we have witnessed, does hit us squarely between the eyes and leaves us helpless.

And while evil as an ever present overwhelming phenomenon engulfs us, the concrete reality of the gap between our individual behavior and the massed power forces lying beyond the individual's control accentuates our feelings of helplessness and dependency.

We have been taught for example, that energy, hard work, thrift and soberness are virtues which cannot fail to lead us into an economic heaven. Yet past and present experience has proved to be disappointing in this respect. The wider our markets, the more economic interdependence, the less are economic rewards distributed according to the puritan scale of economic virtues. The Midwestern farmer for example, found his economic existence after the first World War undermined by wheat exports of Australia, Argentina and Canada. These factors were beyond his control and were divorced from his individual economic behavior. He cannot help but acquire a feeling of helplessness.

Economic "Acts of God"

The fluctuations of the business cycle play fast and loose with the economic existence of producers and workers and are removed from the sphere of individual influence. In the experience of the individual

they are like acts of God, undeserved and incomprehensible and therefore anxiety-creating.

This feeling is reinforced by the fact that most people find themselves in the status of social dependency. By far the larger part of the population work as dependent employees. They have little understanding of what they are doing, they are part of large scale organizations without any knowledge as to how these collectivities operate. Individualistically minded economists and social philosophers are quick to point out that everybody works for himself and in his own interest, even if employed by somebody else. Such rational analysis, however, does not influence the psychological state of mind of those who work "for others." What they experience directly is their dependence upon others, the fact that they have to obey orders, that they do not participate in the formulation of policies, rules and regulations to which they are subjected. Here again the feeling of dependency, of non-participation, of being an insignificant uninfluential part of a large incomprehensible whole is created.

Thus the general fundamental human experience of powerlessness is reinforced by the specific class-status situation. In a society where the individual has a chance to prove himself self-reliant and independent, where he can at least acquire the illusion of being the master of his own social and economic status—like the frontier society of the American pioneer days—the general anxiety which flows from helplessness of the human being and his aloneness in the universe can be alleviated. Our present-day society gives such a chance, if at all, only to a few.

A counterbalance against this lack of self-confidence is created, as Karen Horney points out, in external aggrandisement for prestige and power. Could it be that the disillusionment of mankind because of war and interwar experience is at least one of the unconscious motives behind all this unsettling and disturbing behavior which undermines the basis of our security? Nations, groups and classes are striving to enhance their power and prestige. Could it be in order to counterbalance an unconscious feeling of guilt and self-contempt? The irrational nature of such drives is indicated by the fact that these drives are fundamentally destructive. They do not really increase the power and prestige of the actors, nor do they contribute to their real security. Their very actions bring about or increase the insecurity from which they want to escape.

There is no way that leads out of the fundamental dilemma of human existence. Ineluctable conflict is the basis of our existence. How-

ever, the idea that evil is essential and ineradicable, that the antinomy of good and bad is one of the forms in which the basic human dilemma manifests itself, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the striving for the elimination of evil is senseless. Real insight into the conditions of human existence may show that man has to fight for values whose possible realization may seem doubtful in the light of rational analysis. "To know with despair that the political act is inevitable evil and to act nevertheless, is moral courage." (Hans Morgenthau, in "Ethics," October 1945, p. 18).

Skepticism Can Become Strength

Our statement that evil may be ineradicable has been arrived at through historical and psychological analysis. It does not imply in the least that we should adopt a quietistic attitude toward evil. Modern man cannot accept the easy consolations of other-worldly religion which presents evil as an inevitable by-product of earthly existence and as a result of the activities of the devil. Nor can he believe in the absoluteness of value disclosed by divine revelation. His scepticism, however, can be turned into strength. Historical and psychological analysis shows that evil always has been in existence. We should have the strength to face these facts and not try to comfort ourselves with the easy consolations of a belief in the evolutionary and inevitable force of progress. The belief in the devil and the belief in the inevitability of progress are both intellectual escape mechanisms. They are pretexts and rationalizations created in order to avoid action which alone could effectively change the character structure of man.

The fact that evil, aggression and destruction have always been with us does not justify the conclusion that they always will and should be with us. One can never conclude from what "is" to what "ought to be." If conflict is the norm of human existence the struggle for the good is part of it. By trying to eliminate conflict, aggression and evil we are trying to transcend ourselves. It is the tragedy and the greatness of human destiny that we have to strive for transcendence. Only if we realize that the stars may be beyond our reach and still continue reaching can we grasp the mystery of our existence.

The knowledge of the inescapability of human imperfections may create more tolerant and cooperative attitudes in human relations. By realizing the precarious situation of all mankind including our own we

may become less stubborn and intransigent in the pursuit of our interests and ideals. Our grandiose and optimistic concepts of human nature will have to be discarded. We will have to accept to a certain extent our weaknesses, our conflicts, our schism and our helplessness. As Dwight MacDonald puts it "The trick in living seems to be precisely to reject all complete and well-rounded solutions and to live in a continual state of tension and contradiction which reflects the real nature of man's existence." (Politics, July, 1946, p. 197).

If we accept this mode of life, our conflicts will become less intense and they will generate less anxiety. It is the gulf between our pretenses and the inner and outward reality which makes it so hard to endure life today. If we humbly accept the imperfections of our existence, the inevitable conflicts from which man cannot escape unless he becomes God or beast, we remove an important source for anxiety and insecurity.

The Gesta Romanovrum, a collection of stories and legends of the late Middle Ages, tells about a man called Ganterus who desired more and more pleasures and wanted sensations without end. Once on a journey he met an old sage who sat hunched over a well, bent over his cane. The sage asked Ganterus: "My dear wanderer, where are you coming from?" Ganterus answered: "I come from afar." The sage asked again: "What are you after?" Ganterus: "I am in search of three things and I cannot find them." The sage: "What are these three things?" Ganterus: "Abundance without want, joy without suffering, light without darkness." The story ends with the sage sending Ganterus into a mountain where he finds fulfillment of his three wishes. Such fulfillment is possible only in fairy tales. If our minds and souls could really accept and absorb this truth, if we could really face the impossibility of perfection deep down in our hearts without losing the courage to go on living, we may find a way out of the labyrinth of conflict and strife which we ourselves have built around the basic human dilemma.

AMERICAN SOCIALISTS: WHAT NOW?

By Daniel Bell

After forty-eight honorable years, the Socialist Party as a political instrumentality in American life is finished. The puny vote that Norman Thomas received last November, at a time that was admittedly the best possible opportunity for a resurgence of socialist spirit, obviously spells the demise of the party in the electoral field. So, the question once raised at the turn of the century by the German social economist Werner Sombart in the title of a book, *Why Is There No Socialism in the United States,* still mocks us today, and demands answer before any further decisions are cast regarding the future role of democratic socialists in U. S. politics.

Sombart in his book emphasized three basic considerations as to why a socialist movement had failed to take root in the U. S. up to his time. These were: 1) the open frontier of the country and the chances to escape one's lot by moving west; 2) the opportunity for social ascent through individual effort; 3) the rising standard of living of the country. Yet in the first quarter of the present century, the first factor had disappeared and the other two were being seriously challenged. When Selig Perlman twenty years ago in his *Theory of the Labor Movement* sought to answer the question concerning the lack of class consciousness among American workers, he cited three factors too, recasting somewhat, the Sombart thesis:

1) The absence of a "settled" wage earning class. Settled, in this usage had two meanings, spatially and socially, that is, workers moved about considerably and lacked roots, at the same time class mobility was possible.

2) The free gift of ballot. In other countries where labor had organized politically workers had been denied suffrage, providing tangible evidence of a class problem. In the U. S., the lines were not political and social but economic, and not rigid ones at that.

3) Immigration. Waves of new immigrants would set back the development of the trade unions by widening the labor market and

adding a more unorganizable group. At the same time the existence of such diverse ethnic, religious and linguistic groups created a heterogeneous working class and raised barriers to its cultural unification.

To these explanations, the general historians of American politics have added a third. Given the welter of sectional and economic interests in the U. S., they pointed out, an ideological party is too narrow a vehicle to unite and serve conflicting interest groups.

These answers still serve as the frame of reference. Yet this is not the place for a detailed examination of those premises, necessary as that task may be. Moreover, such analyses deal largely with the external conditions of the American environment whereas the more immediate problem is the assessment of the Socialist movement itself. And while no decision can be taken without reference to the general context, pragmatically, the first question is: why did the Socialist Party fail to understand its environment and adapt accordingly.

If the issue is the nature of the Socialist Party and its own cloudy self-image as a social movement, I would submit as a relevant judgment that the Socialist Party has not been a *political* party, certainly not for the past ten years. There, I feel, is the nub of the issue. For almost the entire length of its history the Socialist Party could never resolve the dilemma, still facing it today, of being a *political* party or an *ethical* movement. And its shuttling back and forth between the two resulted in a series of schisms and ambiguous positions which left it successively impotent.

The usage of the two terms may be defined in this fashion:

In the largest sense society is an organized system for the distribution of tangible rewards and privileges. Within that frame, ethics deals with the ought of distribution, involving a theory of justice. Politics is the concrete manner of distribution involving a power struggle between organized groups to determine the allocation of privilege. In some periods of history, generally in closed societies, ethics and politics have gone hand in hand. But one of the distinguishing features of modern society is the separation of the two. In our time politics has quite often become a struggle for power by dispossessed groups with an ideology fashioned roughhewn after the event to justify the revolutionary changes. Or quite often despite an ideology which is formally integral to the structure of a political movement the net effect of the power struggle is to render the ideology a myth and a mask behind which the naked fights go on. Such is the genuine insight of Marxism and the elite theorists.

If one is to seek a redivision of the rewards and privileges of society —stated quite baldly in Lasswell's phrase as "who gets what, when and how"—then it is only on the field of politics that such a struggle can take place. And if there is a genuine commitment to politics, as a means of implementing the ethical ideal, then one must accept the hazards of evil that are implicit in politics and shun utopianism. Politics then becomes the acceptance of the relevant alternative. One must in the practical sense live with realistic division of institutional forces as they exist. It means operating within the labor movement, accepting its backwardness and the compromises it is forced to make. In that sense the fundamental meaning of the British Labor Party was not its function as an independent party but that the intellectuals in the Fabian Society and the Independent Labor Party went into it whole-heartedly.

The coalescence of the Socialist Party out of the Socialist Labor Party and the populist elements of the West was an attempt to create a *political* movement. The S.L.P. had remote ends and a purist means. It divorced itself from the main stream of American labor and ended as a secrtarian group. The Socialist Party by adopting a set of immediate goals, sought to enter the main stream of political life. During the "rising tide" of socialism, from 1904 to 1912, it elected 56 Mayors, over 300 municipal officials and a Congressman. But while it accepted politics as an arena, in practice the party never undertook that commitment. True, the American S.P.—during the heyday of its growth before World War I—was not wholly a utopian party, *in its appeals to the electorate*. But nor was it truly a *political* party. As much as by Marx, the rhetoric of the party was fashioned by the utopianism of Gronlund and Bellamy and the agrarian insurgency of the Greenbackers and the Populists. The largest party strength was in the West where it inherited the remnants of the populist movement of the '90s. Its 1908 platform declared "The Socialist Party does not strive to substitute working class rule for capitalist class rule but—to free all humanity from class rule." The Bellamy nationalists, and the Gronland utopians sought to commit the Party to abstract schemes. These and other groups produced a series of factional fights. From the start the S.P. was plagued by crackpot proposals. It had the remnants of the "impossibilists" who sought to reject immediate reforms; the syndicalists who scorned political action; the revolutionary agrarians, who at one point, in Oklaboma actually attempted an armed insurrection, the famed "Green Corn Rebellion," and others, culminating in the Communist

left wing program of 1919 which sought to prepare for an immediate revolution.

The failure to resolve these conflicts often gave rise to weird schismatic discussions about the purity of the party, discussions that rivalled in intensity and meaningfulness the scholastic discussions of the medieval schoolmen. In one of the early national conventions of the party, for example, almost two days was spent on the issue of seating a delegate who was employed by the capitalist state. The credentials of an old engineer who held a municipal sinecure was challenged on the grounds that he was by virtue of his employment an agent of the class enemy. The man pleaded that he had the position because he was a civil war veteran, that he had obtained the job long before the Socialist Party was formed, and that his job was technical, not political. In typical fashion, the credentials committee, headed then by Algernon Lee, voted out a compromise resolution in which the engineer was seated for particular reasons although the general principle of denying convention vote to an employee of the capitalist state was upheld.

Cute as that story is, it symbolized an insoluble position which similar reform movements have been trapped, for in effect the party was "in the world, but not of it." American Socialists in their ideology rejected completely the whole foundation of capitalist society, yet were called on daily to take concrete stands on practical issues that grew out of the soil of the society. To a movement like the Communists such a delimma is no problem. For them immediate reforms are not a genuine way of helping the worker, but only one more weapon to batter down the walls of the social structure. And because they do not fundamentally believe in immediate reforms, they can quite often raise exaggerated and embarassing demands. But a "responsible" trade unionist or Socialist cannot afford that luxury. For him the reform is real as a means of helping the worker alleviate basic insecurities, rather than being illusory. Thus compromise after compromise is inevitable.

On a more serious level, the acid test of this dilemma was the relationship of the Socialist Party to the New Deal. For the first time in its history, the trade union movement of the U. S. was receiving considerable political help from a party ruling the government. It was inevitable that the unions would tie in closely with the political fortunes and destiny of Franklin D. Roosevelt. And the Socialists who were union officials would have to choose between their allegiance to the party and their committments to the needs of the union. At the same time the party

was being split by the fight of the Militants versus the Old Guard on a resolution regarding the party's attitude toward revolution. Mechanically translating the German and Austrian debacles into the American scene, the party's left wing wrote a resolution which advocated armed insurrection in case of fascism and war and sought to impose a stricter discipline over the party membership. Yet less than four years after the passage of the resolution, almost every major leader of the left-wing who was a trade union official was out of the party and a supporter of Roosevelt. In retrospect, the S.P.'s left-wing had completely misread the course of immediate history and had attempted to commit the party to what seemed to be the most realistic politics but in effect continued and deepened its alienation from the labor movement as a whole. The S.P.'s muddled stand on the war drained the party of its final strength and left it impotent. Because war was a great evil and its existence a negation of the humane ideals of Socialism, it had to be fought. Yet fascism was also an evil and had to be combatted. In politics, however, there cannot be two enemies; only one can be fought at a time. The S.P.'s answer to the dilemma was the slogan "the best way to stop fascism is to make democracy work at home." This was true in a limited sense. But the main concern of the anti-fascist movement had to be with the political center of fascist power, Hitler's Berlin, and the entire area it controlled, not the political center of the U. S. The S.P. never found an answer.

In the character of Norman Thomas, its leader for twenty years, the S.P. dilemma found its most concentrated expression. For Thomas's position was thought through first on moral grounds and then compromised by political considerations. The resulting blend had an appealing flavor, but no body. It gave Thomas great stature as a moral figure of high courage. It also gave Thomas a black mark as a political leader. While Thomas the individual grew in strength, the Socialist Party as a political movement fell lower and lower.

* * *

For both Sombart and Perlman, the backwardness so-called of the American worker was due largely to the high social mobility that prevailed in the U. S. Yet it cannot be doubted today that a large proportion of workers have come to accept the fact that they will remain as workers the rest of their lives and will not rise on the economic ladder. In a sense the growth of trade unionism is an acceptance of this fact.

The whole tenor of the labor movement of the nineteenth century—and one of the prime reasons for its instability—was an attempt to escape the lot of being a worker. The earliest efforts were toward free land, later toward cooperative production and finally, abortively, into politics. It was only when large groups of craft workers came to accept their role as permanent that the American Federation of Labor could sink roots. And similarly, the organization of the mass production industries and the large numbers of semi-skilled workers was only possible because the fear of insecurity was a lash that drove them to combine. Does that mean a new radical politics in American life? Such was the prediction once of Friedrich Engels. In a letter to Friedrich Sorge, the caretaker of the First International, Engels wrote, in a letter dated September 16, 1886:

"In a country as primitive as America, which has developed in a purely bourgeois fashion without any feudal past, but has unwittingly taken over from England a whole store of ideology from feudal times, such as the English common law, religion, and sectarianism, and where the exigencies of practical labor and the concentrating of capital have produced a contempt for all theory, which is only now disappearing in the educated circle of scholars—in such a country the people must become conscious of their own social interests by making blunder upon blunder. Nor will that be spared the workers; the confusion of the trade unions, socialists, Knights of Labor, etc., will persist for some time to come, and they will learn only by their own mistakes. But the main thing is that they have started moving, that things are going ahead generally, that the spell is broken; and they will go fast, too, faster than anywhere else, even though on a singular road, which seems, from the theoretical standpoint, to be an almost insane road."

While presumably the customary detachment of the outsider allows him to see us often better than we can ourselves, I am afraid that in this case Engels is less than a minor prophet. For while American workers are moving, the whole frame of reference has so shifted that some new propositions are in order. First, the growth of a "settled" feeling among workers has not led to a radicalization, but to an insistent two-fold demand for security: security in the shop through seniority systems, firing only for cause, resistance to technological change, etc.; and security in the larger society through unemployment insurance, old-age pensions, health insurance, etc. And the growth of the trade union as an instrument to realize that security has meant the development of

an institutional force that has had to, necessarily, grow integrally into the very fabric of society. Whereas the fundamental outlook of nineteenth century utopian unionism (the Workingmen's Party, Sylvis, Knights of Labor, De Leon, the Syndicalists) was to change capitalist society, the fundamental drive of twentieth century unionism is to assure a place and some weight in that social order.

The second salient fact is that the pressure of large segments of society for protection against the boom-and-bust cycle of unrestrained capitalism has given rise to a new administrative state. Fuzzy as its outlines may be, the consistent pattern of price support for farmers, bargaining rights for labor—or withdrawal of those rights—government spending to maintain consumer income, and government taxation to meet fixed charges, particularly the growing interest on the national debt, all presage the managed economy of the next decade and further. And when one has a managed economy, the stakes in politics are greater. In that sense the compulsions for trade unions to enter politics are pressing and direct. It was apparent during the Roosevelt regime; it was obvious after 1946 when control of Congress by reactionaries showed how threatening political checks could be. But fearful as some unionists may be of big government, the commitment to politics can not be evaded.

Some socialists hope that with the entry of labor into politics, the chances for an independent labor party is now brighter. While independent labor action is certainly in order, it is a serious misreading of the American political scene to hope at this point to talk of a new *party*. For the issues are too urgent and the stakes too great for U. S. labor to think of that long and hard pull of stepping outside the traditional two party system and seek to win popular support in its own name. Certainly all political logic is against it. One case in point, a laboratory experiment in its own way, is the campaign in the last election by Maynard Kreuger for Congress in Illinois on an independent ticket. Seemingly the situation was ideal. A district had been gerrymandered two years previously by the G.O.P. state legislature and a Republican had won handily for Congress from a Democrat who had held the seat for years. Vail, the Republican, had run up a black reactionary record in Congress even to the extent of assailing Senator Taft as a socialist for sponsoring a mild housing subsidy bill. In addition he was a member of the Un-American Committee and had helped smear a leading scientist. Part of the district included the University of Chicago and a liberal ward whose alderman

at that time was a liberal. The Democrats to the dismay of the Independent Voters of Illinois, the A.D.A. affiliate, nominated an old party wheelhorse, presumably because the district was conceded. Kreuger, the S.P. Vice-Presidential candidate in 1940, a U. of C. professor and a popular individual in the district, having campaigned previously for alderman, was persuaded to run. Because election laws made filing as a Socialist difficult, he ran as an independent, an added advantage to those who feared the party tag. Kreuger's entry won a good response among the students and liberals in the area, a (relatively) large sum of money was raised and the issues presented vigorously. Yet on election day, to everybody's surprise, the Democrat won, and Kreuger trailed badly. Out of 150,000 votes cast, Kreuger had obtained less than 6,000. But the most striking lesson was not the election result but a comparison with the party primary. In the general election, a total of 150,000 votes were cast. Yet in the Democratic primary, where the victor was nominated only 30,000 votes were cast. In that primary, the official Democratic nominee was opposed by an eccentric individual who without much of a campaign polled almost as many votes in the primary as Kreuger did in the entire election.

It seems likely that if the independent campaign had been waged directly in the primaries, the equal expenditure of time and money would have produced proportionately greater results. Such a lesson is not new. It is the oldest in populist politics. In North Dakota the Socialists struggled for many years with little results. In 1914 a few stepped outside the party and organized the North Dakota Non-Partisan League. In less than two years, operating within the Republican primary, the traditional party of that state, it won the major state offices and broke the hold of the Minneapolis flour mill owners on the North Dakota wheat farmers. It was a lesson practiced for a long time by the elder La Follette and his sons and they failed in large part when they sought to organize their own party.

Before World War I the tactic of Socialists entering old-party primaries was becoming frequent. And they won in Oklahoma and a number of other states. Yet, as Oscar Ameringer found out in the end, they won a party but lost their Socialism. Valid as those specific fears may be, they miss the essential point that today the trade union movement has to move on a national scale and in national political terms A victory in one area then does not slip by the board but becomes a springboard for more extensive political action. At least this proposition

will be tested in the role of the U.A.W. and its success in capturing the Michigan Democratic party and much of the state administration.

Given the structure of American politics, it is likely that political unionism will operate largely within the Democratic Party. While it means an organizational tie to that party, no full ideological commitment is necessary because the American party system as a brokerage house demands no ideological loyalties. In this sense, Socialists have a positive role to play. As intellectual catalysts, they could offer a comprehensive program and work for its adoption by the trade unions. A necessary first step in that direction would be a formal statement by the Socialist Party forsaking electoral activity on a national scale. It would free many of its own people and give them freer play to be effective. It would draw closer persons in the trade union movement who for practical reasons follow the political line of labor and have to eschew Socialist contact.

To a real degree, trade unionism in the U. S. is less than fifteen years old. Within that brief time it has soared from two-and-a-half to fifteen million organized workers. In the Taft-Hartley Act, U. S. labor found its own Taff-Vale decision and the committment to political action is now secure. The demise of the Socialist Party as an electoral party in that situation is not a tragic event, but a clearing of the ground. It could allow for the emergency of a new intellectual leadership on the left which would attempt, working within the body politic of labor, as a *political* force, to crystallize a new intellectual orientation. Such a one is long overdue.

LABOR AND STATE IN AMERICA: NEW DEPARTURE

By Alfred Braunthal

Public opinion had the right instinct when it viewed the outcome of the 1948 elections as a great victory for organized labor; but at the same time it showed a great misconception about the degree of coherence and stability of the labor vote and about the issues involved in these elections for labor and for the nation as a whole.

The labor vote is frequently believed to be a very unstable element —shifting sand on which it would be hard to build a new solid structure of government. The issues which were at stake for labor in these elections were frequently believed to be confined to the fields of labor and social legislation, with the Taft-Hartley Act as the principal issue.

It is generally not realized clearly that although technically the Taft-Hartley Act, indeed, played a leading part in labor's election campaign, the principal issues were of a much more fundamental nature than that of a code of industrial relations. What was at stake in these elections was actually the relationship of the state to the economy and of labor to the state. The outcome of the elections marks a decisive step in the transformation of the functions of government which began in the first phase of the New Deal era, and a no less decisive step in labor's integration into these new functions.

The Labor Vote

For comprehension of these facts it is first of all necessary to understand the political basis of the new relationship between labor and the government, that is, the labor vote. I believe that a thorough election analysis would show that the labor vote is a much more dependable and stable factor in the play of political forces than is generally assumed. From the beginning of the New Deal era the labor vote has proved a more stable and reliable support for the New Deal than the farm vote on the one hand or the vote of the urban middle classes on the other. The last elections have confirmed this fact.

The most striking trend revealed in the 1948 elections is the

return of the farmers to the Democratic camp. President Roosevelt, after 1936, lost a large part of the farm vote that he had wrested from the Republicans in the beginning of the New Deal. That this process of defection has been halted and to a certain extent reversed in the last election is the most remarkable sociological trend revealed by the polls. In the nine states outside the South in which the farm population in 1940 formed more than forty per cent of the total population of these states (Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Montana, Idaho and New Mexico) the Democratic vote increased from 2,108,653 or 46.9 per cent of the total vote in these states in 1944 to 2,336,697, or 50.5 per cent in 1948.

In contrast to this increase in the Democratic farm vote, there was a marked decline in the urban Democratic vote. In the ten most highly urbanized states, in which the urban population in 1940 formed more than 65.7 per cent of the total population of these states (Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan and California), the Democratic vote declined from 14,624,094, or 52.1 per cent of the total vote in these states in 1944 to 13,505,734, or 47.9 per cent in 1948.

The most highly industrialized states (New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, New Jersey and Connecticut, which Roosevelt carried in 1944) were lost in 1948; in Illinois, California and Ohio the Truman majorities were microscopic, although in Illinois Wallace was thrown off the ballot. Massachusetts was the only one in this group of states which was carried by Truman with a comfortable majority.

It would not be correct to trace these losses to the defection of the Wallace forces alone. This would hold true only for New York. The other industrial states, with the exception of Massachusetts and Ohio, showed an increase in the percentage of the Republican vote.

However, these shifts in the urban vote seem to signify a decline in the Democratic labor vote only in the two states in which Wallace had an appreciable following, New York and California. In most other states the Wallace vote seems to have been recruited mainly from the ranks of the intellectuals. American labor, like labor in all other Anglo-Saxon countries, has proved to be immune against Communism. The stability of the labor vote has not suffered from the inroads of totalitarianism.

There is no reason to assume that more workers stayed at home or voted Republican in 1948 than in the preceding election. It is rather

fair to assume that the shift in favor of the Republicans in the industrial states is traceable to a continuation of the process of defection of the urban middle classes from the New Deal camp which already characterized the latter part of Roosevelt's administration.

Did Labor "Deliver the Votes?"

If, then, aside from the break-away of the very small Wallace sector the bulk of labor, which had sworn allegiance to Roosevelt, transferred this allegiance to his successor, the question arises why public opinion was so surprised about this very natural development. The opinion polls, unreliable as they proved to be as instruments of forecasting election results, had at least proved reliable in confirming the general feeling that, outside of New York, Wallace had no chance to wean substantial labor votes away from Truman.

If not only this very plausible forecast of the opinion polls met with the agreement of public opinion, but also their erroneous forecast of a weak Democratic labor vote, the ultimate responsibility for this grave misjudgment of the mood of the workers must lie in a very widespread misconception about the relationship between union leaders and workers which had gained an amazing popularity in the last few years.

The belief of some of the sponsors of the Taft-Hartley Act that secret union shop elections would reveal a lack of allegiance of union members to their organizations was, of course, particularly naive. The union shop provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act proved to be a terrible boomerang for all the Peglers who had spread the abstruse fable that the bulk of the union members are suppressed or oppressed anti-unionists. More intelligent observers of the labor scene were always aware that workers join unions and stick to them because they appreciate the advantages they owe to them. But even among this group of observers it had become extremely popular to doubt the ability of the union leaders "to deliver the vote."

This notion, which entirely contradicted earlier experiences in the New Deal era, had first become popular in the 1940 elections when John L. Lewis dismally failed in his attempt to induce his miners to switch their allegiance from Roosevelt to Willkie. The disaster of the 1946 elections strengthened the impression that labor leaders were unable to deliver the vote.

The fallacy of this notion stems from its lack of sociological insight. The worker in a democratic society is, of course, no slave who can be

commandeered to vote as his master—or a totalitarian state—wills. But although the vote of the worker in a democratic community cannot be "delivered" like merchandise, it can be made consonant with the political convictions of his leaders, provided there is fundamental agreement between the leader and the led. This agreement can generally be taken for granted. It can be strengthened by skillful propaganda and intense education.

But there are exceptions to the rule of fundamental agreement between labor leaders and workers, and in these instances no degree of propaganda and education will persuade the worker to vote and act against his innermost convictions and interests. John L. Lewis' political failure both at the 1940 elections and at the 1948 elections is a classic example of the inner logic and inescapability of this sociological law. The failure of the Communist union leaders to win the political allegiance of their union members is another point in case.

What happened in 1946, however, lies on an entirely different plane. At these elections it was not inability, but unwillingness to deliver the vote, that was responsible for the disaster. It was, on the part of both the leaders and the led, a political lassitude which resulted from postwar fatigue in the laborious and not always satisfactory job of keeping economic controls in operation and of fighting against the powerful economic forces which were undermining these controls.

This fight was psychologically all the more difficult to conduct and the fighting spirit all the more bound to flag as the workers and their leaders felt that they had a just grievance against the way the government had handled controls over wages during the war. It should not be forgotten that in the Summer of 1946, when the attack against the continuation of price controls reached its climax, the AFL officially came out in favor of their relaxation. This may have been psychologically understandable and may have, by and large, reflected the mood prevailing among the workers, but it could not create an atmosphere conducive to a large outpouring of the labor vote in favor of pro-Truman candidates.

Thus a clear understanding of the labor scene, even after the elections of 1946 would have prevented the misconception about the inability of labor leaders to deliver the vote. But why this misconception continued even on the threshold of the 1948 elections is hard to grasp. The Eightieth Congress surely gave the electorate an instructive lesson about the stupendous inability of the Republicans and conservative

Democrats to have the slightest understanding of the most elementary social needs. This was demonstrated not only in the case of the Taft-Hartley Act, but also in the failure of Congress to adopt measures of the most urgent social necessity, such as the adjustment of minimum wages and social security benefits to the rising cost of living and measures designed to ease the housing shortage.

This stubborn anti-social attitude of the Eightieth Congress was bound, not to lead the workers back to the camp of the New Deal, because they had never abandoned it, but to arouse them from the lethargy of the immediate postwar period. As has been previously state, it is highly improbable that more workers voted for Truman than had voted for Roosevelt in 1944. But there was certainly no reason whatsoever to assume that after their experience with the Eightieth Congress more workers should have voted for Dewey or stayed at home than four years before.

The unions led the fight against the spirit of the Eightieth Congress under the banner of the defense of labor's rights against their violation through the Taft-Hartley Act. But even if the policymakers of that Congress had not committed the deadly blunder of provoking the wrath of organized labor by the adoption of a blunt anti-labor law, the outcome of the elections could not have been different.

It followed from this analysis that the labor vote at the 1948 elections in itself did not mark a turning point in the history of this country, but only confirmed the fact that since the inception of the New Deal the labor vote has proved to be very stable, incomparably more so than that of the farmers and the urban middle classes. This fact has a positive and a negative aspect. Its positive aspect is that the composition of the last Roosevelt Congress, which had been lost in 1946 by default, was restored. Its negative aspect is that, as under Roosevelt, the labor movement has not yet proved strong enough to arouse from its political indifference that obviously rather broad section of the working class which by abstaining from voting gives the edge in Congress to the conservative wing of the Democrats. This obstacle to a truly progressive policy without the need for compromises still stands.

The Change in Labor's Spirit

When all this has been said, the question still remains to be answered what actually has changed on the side of labor since no change has occurred in the size of the labor vote. It is the spirit of the

labor movement and its functions and responsibilities within the state that have changed rather than its numerical strength.

Let me relate a significant episode which will illustrate this change in spirit and functions of the American labor movement. For the first time since the war the German trade union movement was officially represented at the last AFL convention. That means that the convention was attended by labor representatives from that country in which the traditions of a class-conscious, primarily politically-oriented labor movement are older than in any other country. After the convention the representative of the trade unions in the American Zone, Markus Schleicher, reported on his impressions in the International Free Trade Union News. In this report he made the following confession:

> "I had frequently heard that indifference to political problems is a shortcoming of the American trade unions. But what I saw in Cincinnati was quite the opposite. Never has a trade union convention in Germany—and I have attended many—dealt with the political problems of the world in a manner as detailed and clear-cut as that of the A. F. of L. in Cincinnati. For me, this was one of the most precious experiences which I shall bring back to my German homeland."

Indeed, what Schleicher brought back from the 1946 convention of the AFL to his homeland was the understanding of a turning point in the history of American labor and of this nation as a whole which has not yet been fully apprehended even in this country, let alone in Europe.

From a purely technical point of view one could reply to the comparison between American and German trade union conventions, by pointing out that the very existence of political labor parties in Europe restricts the trade union movement there to a narrower scope than that of the American unions. Since in this country the political functions of the labor movement are not carried out by the institution of a political party, it is but logical that the supreme bodies of the American labor movement, the conventions of the AFL and CIO, should deal much more intensely with political problems, both of domestic and of world policy, than those of European labor unions.

But what is logically plausible, is not always sociologically true. If Schleicher had attended the AFL convention of 1947, he would have found much less politics discussed—aside from the Taft-Hartley Act issue—than at the convention which followed the 1948 elections; and if he had attended AFL conventions in the pre-New Deal era, he would have found incomparably less political discussion than now.

It is this progressive change in the political spirit of the American labor movement which signifies the most fundamental change in its tructure. But to understand it thoroughly, we must briefly review its development from the Gompers era on.

Stages in Labor's Political Philosophy

The Gompers tradition of the American labor movement was not one of aloofness from politics. It was non-partisan, but not non-political. It was based on a political philosophy which was perfectly adjusted to the attitude of the bulk of American workers towards society as it existed in that period. It was a society in which the American worker, provided he was really free to organize and bargain collectively, did not consider himself oppressed and exploited, and with whose dynamism he was basically in agreement because he felt that he could participate in the opportunities which lay in the great tradition of the American dream and to a large extent also of the American reality.

The society, as it then existed, required a minimum of state interference with an economic mechanism which still secured a fairly steady rise in the general welfare of the country, not without occasional setbacks, but without any major catastrophes. The sphere of political interest was therefore very restricted for all strata of society, and the major political interest in which organized labor was involved and for which it fought very vigorously was a negative one: its interest in overcoming the grave obstacles which the state—particularly its juridical arm—placed in the path of labor's freedom to organize and bargain collectively. It was, as it were, a continuous fight against a Taft-Hartley situation.

However, there was one episode in the pre-New Deal history of American labor in which a situation developed which strongly resembled that of today. This was the situation of the First World War when, for the first time in American history, the government was forced to assume a huge role in organizing the country and its economy for a global war and in which, also for the first time, this country was called upon to play a leading role in shaping the destiny of the world. It is extremely interesting and encouraging to note that as soon as this situation developed, the American labor movement almost overnight grew into a political function which has a striking resemblance to the functions the labor movement is now ready to assume.

The unions came to be represented in all government agencies and

governmentally sponsored committees dealing with the war and especially with the war economy. They played their cards in the field of world politics as well. The formation of the International Labor Organization and its embodiment in the peace treaty was virtually the work of the American labor unions, and to a large extent of Samuel Gompers personally.

One need only read the section of the Treaty of Versailles dealing with labor and with the International Labor Organization to realize how profound was the interest of American labor in a free world of social justice and free labor—exactly as it is today—and to what an astounding degree its attitude towards the role of government and of labor in society had veered towards a point that was not reached again by American labor until the present era.

However, the First World War and the changes it caused in American society and in the relationship of labor to government remained an isolated episode. As soon as American society reverted to its old structure and its isolation in the world, American labor too reverted to its traditional role within this society. But it is worth recollecting this episode not only because it shows the fundamentally political character of American labor even in the pre-New Deal era, but also because it shows that even before the adjustment of the labor movement to new political roles and to a new relationship to government in the New Deal period, it already possessed enough flexibility to improvise very similar status when the need for it arose.

It is debatable whether the decisive turning point in the functions of government and of labor within the state dates from the Roosevelt phase of the New Deal or from its present phase. That the inauguration of the New Deal marked a turning point in the nature of government and in the functions of labor cannot be denied, and its importance should by no means be minimized.

It is, however, necessary to realize how narrow and improvised the range of the new governmental activities in the prewar period of the New Deal still was and how limited, therefore, the range of the new role of labor in its relation to the government was bound to be. The goal of the New Deal, from its inception, was the creation of a society of plenty for all and of social welfare through governmental intervention to the extent that such intervention was needed.

But the concept of such a socio-economic system and the tools for its realization were still extremely defective. One needs only recollect

the fact that throughout the entire New Deal period until the outbreak of the war in Europe the average number of unemployed dropped in no year below 7,700,000. A state of the economy in which so huge a percentage of workers were jobless would appear intolerable and unthinkable under the present "New New Deal" concept of government.

The war changed this situation with one stroke. The integration of labor into the system of a planned economy of full employment and of a huge expansion of productive forces, which characterized the First World War, was repeated on a much broader scale. But the integration of labor into the war effort and into the war economy could have been considered as no less episodic than the parallel situation of the First World War, had the Second World War not seen the emergence of a fundamental concept, the concept of the full-employment economy which, combined with the original New Deal concept of the welfare economy, at last fully implemented the philosophy of the New Deal.

Indeed, with the new concept of the full-employment economy a second phase of the New Deal and of the new relation of labor to the government was destined to take shape. But the turn of events which fell into the three-year period between the end of the war and the 1948 elections impeded rather than accelerated the development of this new phase.

First the labor movement, as has previously been mentioned, weakened in its determination to keep intact those governmental controls over the economy which were needed for maintaining the stability of the economy. Then the Dark Ages of the Eightieth Congress descended upon the nation. Labor was suddenly forced into the defensive and the assumption of new functions of government and of labor was out of question.

Labor's New Functions and Problems

The full meaning of the 1948 elections seems then to be that they have created the opportunity to progress from the narrower economic and social concept of the original New Deal to the present more integral concept of the full-employment economy. This step was due after the war, but was delayed for three years through adverse psychological and political conditions. In other words, the goal of the social and economic welfare state of full employment and of a stable, steadily-expanding economy, which the New Deal in its pre-war phase, never was able to

implement, seems now really within the reach of the possible range of practical politics.

Not only is the government today, compared with the pre-war phase of the New Deal, equipped with much better technical tools for working on this goal and incomparably more favored by the existing economic conditions, but it is prodded by much stronger and much more compelling forces. Domestically, organized labor has gained a much better understanding of the need for and the machinery of a full-employment economy and it is more determined than ever to use its strengthened political power to achieve this goal.

In addition, as an entirely new element compared with the pre-war era, the dominant position of the United States in the Western World and Soviet aggression forces the United States to keep its economic machinery intact. A major business depression would appear as a disastrous defeat in the fight against the aggressor and would cripple the economic reconstruction of the Western world.

We need not go here into the details of the role which the labor movement will have to play in this new phase of the New Deal. It suffices to refer, as an example, to the vital functions which the American unions already have taken over within the Economic Cooperation Administration to give an inkling of the vast responsibilities which await labor in all fields of political, social, economic and cultural activities.

True, to be called upon to do an important job is one thing, and to be prepared and equipped for doing it properly is another. The job of widening the scope of labor's activities and the responsibilities which go with it are staggering. Is organized labor prepared and equipped for this new task? Its equipment is certainly not a hundred per cent perfect. This is but natural in view of the fact that the personnel needed to take over multiplied functions cannot grow out of the labor organizations from one day to the other. But even with respect to personnel questions, the labor unions, as the example of their participation in ECA has shown, have proved to be much better equipped than had been generally expected.

What gives rise to even more optimism is labor's political and psychological preparation for its new functions. This holds true both for the AFL and the CIO. The CIO had to overcome a dangerous weakness before it could prepare itself properly for labor's new function: the powerful position of the Communists in its leading ranks. This job has now been done with a thoroughness which would have been unim-

aginable even a year ago. The AFL still has to overcome the weight of a venerable tradition. It too has been working on this job with an unexpected energy. It is less in the official announcements and pronouncements of the AFL that its adjustment to its new work has been reflected than in the new spirit which animates this organization. This spirit manifested itself in Cincinnati at the last AFL convention, as well as in the enthusiasm and elan with which the AFL has been fulfilling its new great position in the international field.

A stern warning against over-optimism may still be in order. What has been sketched here in this brief analysis is an outline of a new trend of historic importance which is beginning to take shape. This is not to contend that this trend will develop without any opposition, friction, and setbacks. Major difficulties may be expected from within and from without. From within there are still the difficulties involved in the split in the house of labor in the last remnants of Communist power within the CIO and of the pre-New Deal philosophy in the AFL, in the isolationism of John L. Lewis, as well as in all the sources of human frailty and weakness which are inherent in a vast organization of fifteen million people.

From without there still loom two major impediments. There is, first of all, the danger of a powerful alliance of Republicans and conservative Democrats in Congress on issues of decisive importance. Another weakness stems from the fact that labor, having no party of its own, lacks the direct political apparatus for making its weight felt at all times and at all proper places.

Yet of all these weaknesses and difficulties there are none that need be fundamental, none that could not be overcome with energy, will power, and enthusiasm. Labor has now a goal within its reach for which it is worth expending all the vigor, will power, and enthusiasm of which a great movement is capable.

BOLSHEVISM

Reflections on Bertram Wolfe's "Three Who Made a Revolution: Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin."

By Boris Sapir

The revolutions of March and November 1917 brought the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party into the arena of world history and made the study of its development an imperative necessity for political students and journalists. The impressive works by Wolfe, Souvarine and Shub [1] are sufficient indication that the questions which once agitated but small circles of unknown Russian emigres in Geneva or Paris have now become the subject of careful study by all who try to understand the meaning of the events which have filled the first decades of the twentieth century.

It is rather interesting that all the above works are devoted not to the history of the Russian Revolution itself, but to the biographies of the most prominent leaders of the party and the revolution. The Russian Social Democratic Labor Party and the Russian Revolution have not yet found their historians. However, since it was impossible to write the biographies of the leaders of the movements without the closest scrutiny of history, each of the three authors mentioned above has also made his contribution to the history of the Social Democratic Labor Party in Russia.

From the point of view of the study of Bolshevism, the biographies of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin are organically interrelated. Bolshevism is inconceivable without Lenin, who laid the foundations of the movement. But the Bolshevism which was victorious in 1917 incorporated a number of ideas developed by Trotsky. And the Bolshevism which stood the test of thirty years after the November upheaval has been Stalinism.

Wolfe aptly demonstrates how Lenin, in criticizing Trotsky's concepts in 1905, foresaw what many of us now call the "Stalinist degeneration" of the dictatorship of a revolutionary minority. He also quotes Trotsky, who argued with Lenin in 1903-1904 that the latter's organ-

[1] Bertram D. Wolfe—"Three Who Made A Revolution: Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin," New York, 1948. Boris Souvarine—"Stalin," New York, 1939. David Shub—"Lenin," New York, 1948.

izational principles must lead to the rule of an all-powerful dictator over the party and the country, or—to use contemporary terms—to totalitarianism. November was the child of Lenin and Trotsky. But the logical outcome of the Bolshevik victory under the guidance of the two former Social Democratic leaders was bound to be the totalitarian regime of Stalin. Stalin is the double, or, to quote Dostoyevski's expression, the "ape" of Lenin and Trotsky.

In rare and brief flashes of prophetic vision, Lenin foresaw where Trotsky's ideas were leading Russia. The latter, in turn, more frequently, though also in isolated moments, foretold the inevitability of the degeneration of Leninism. But such prophesies are not characteristic of either man. In the ultimate analysis, their entire activity was directed toward the realization of plans which prepared the triumph of Stalinism.

Only Menshevism provided consistent and steadfast resistance throughout its history to the movement which led to the worst form of slavery that Russia has ever known. It cannot be said that the Mensheviks were, from the outset, fully aware of the true nature of Bolshevism. Nevertheless, the remarkable articles by Paul B. Axelrod, published in "Iskra," in 1904, reveal amazing insight. And Julius Martov's struggle against Lenin's methods demanded great moral courage and ideological clarity, since it encountered not only lack of understanding on the part of wide circles of Russian revolutionary intelligentsia, but even the condemnation of a man like Karl Kautsky. It required great clarity of vision and a true instinct to raise, almost forty years ago, the banner of struggle, at first against comrades in the same organization, then against one of the strongest revolutionary parties, and finally against a government which claimed to be the true champion of socialism.

We cannot here summarize the contents of Wolfe's book. With objectivity and great knowledge of the material, the author presents the story of Russian Social Democracy against the background of Russian history, and paints the portraits of the three leaders of the November Revolution upon this historic backdrop. It is doubtful whether any Russian historian who devoted himself to the special study of the movement could have given a better picture of the events of those years than the American Wolfe.[2]

[2] We wish here to mention several of the author's statements which, in our opinion, require correction. Julius Martov was not a leader in the "Bund," although he made some contribution to the ideology of this party in its very early period. Paul B. Axelrod remained abroad after the 1905 Revolution not due to ill-health,

What Is Bolshevism?

His book again and again leads the reader to return to the question: what is Bolshevism?

Forty-five years ago, at the time of the initial split between the followers of Lenin and those of Martov at the Second Convention of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, very few persons could explain the substance of the disagreements which broke the unity of the seemingly monolithic editorial board of the "Iskra." And yet it was easier at that time to formulate the difference between the two factions than it is today.

Similarly, if we take the periods of the 1905 Revolution, the years 1910-1914, the start of the First World War, or the Revolution of 1917, the differences which separate the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks during each period lent themselves more easily to generalization than they do at present. And yet, in the past, few people regarded the disagreements dividing the two groups as insuperable, while today there is clearly an abyss between these trends.

Lenin and Martov differed on the question of the structure of the party organization. Lenin preferred a closed group of "professional revolutionists," while Martov favored opening the doors of the party to the broad mass of workers. Even if one accepts Martov's point of view, one cannot but admit a certain measure of truth in Lenin's remark that socialism is brought into the workers' movement from the outside, and that without a socialist intelligentsia it is impossible to build a socialist labor movement.

In the Revolution of 1905, the Mensheviks firmly opposed the participation of Social-Democrats in a provisional revolutionary government, if such a government should arise, while the Bolsheviks preached the idea of a coalition government of Russian workers and peasants. In 1917, however, the two parties seemed to have exchanged their viewpoints: the Mensheviks took part in the Provisional Government, and the Bolsheviks branded this coalition as treason to the proletariat.

The Mensheviks took the initiative first in 1905 and then in March 1917, in organizing Soviets of Workers' Deputies, trade unions, workers'

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but because of the death of his wife. The name "Iskra" and its epigraph ("Iskra" means "Spark" — "The Spark will kindle a flame") were suggested not by Lenin, but by A. N. Potresov. We have also noticed two typographical errors: Martynov's real name was Picker, and not Pickel (p. 314); the well-known Social Revolutionary was Rubanovich, and not Buranovich (p. 628).

cooperatives, and other non-partisan mass organizatios. The Bolsheviks were opposed to this form of mass organization, they wanted to subordinate all these organization directly to the Social Democratic Party. But in 1917 the Bolsheviks gave up their opposition to the Soviets and Lenin became the most ardent champion of these "non-partisan" bodies.

It would take us too far afield to attempt to list all the changes in Bolshevik strategy which took place on their road to power—and after they came into power. The Mensheviks, too, had their shortcomings and faults. But Menshevism turned out to be right, after all, in its historic dispute with Bolshevism.

But at the beginning the differences between these two concepts did not appear very essential. The factions which today are divided by a stream of blood that cannot be bridged any more, were decades ago only minor differences of opinion. What, then, was there in Bolshevism that repelled the Menshevik leaders, the Martovs, Axelrods, Poterssovs, even at that early stage and remained in it despite all the zigzags of Lenin and Stalin?

The theories concerning Bolshevism that are most popular among Mensheviks give no answer to the question posed above. Axelrod, who was the first to point out that the division between the adherents of Lenin and Martov was rooted in matters of principle, prepared the mind for the understanding of the anti-socialist role which was to be played by the Bolsheviks. Martov, in his articles on "World Bolshevism," written in 1919-1920, tried to explain the reasons for the Bolshevik success which seemed to contradict the basic premises of Marxism.

Theodore Dan, who left the Mensheviks in 1940 and came very close to Bolshevism, attributes the split of the Social Democrats into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks to the unique character of Russian historic development; the dual task of the socialist and democratic transformation of the country had been broken up into its component parts. Up to 1917, according to him, the Mensheviks performed essentially the socialist part of this task, while the Bolsheviks pursued the democratic part. After the revolution, the two movements exchanged their respective roles. Dan's thesis is highly disputable in its application to Russia, and clearly does not correspond to what we observe in Western Europe, where the contradition between Menshevism and Bolshevism takes the form of a contradiction between democratic socialism and dictatorial communism.

Edward Bernstein, in his "Premises of Socialism and the Tasks

of Social Democracy," published in 1897, came closer than all the others to the solution of the problem of Bolshevism. Of course, Bernstein had no thought of Bolshevism, which had not yet come into existence when he was writing his book—a summing up of the results of socialist experience during the second half of the nineteenth century. But his theory can be applied very well to Bolshevism.

Bernstein found, in the socialist movement two basic tendencies. One aspired to social transformation as formulated by such thinkers as Owen, Fourier, and others. The second derived its inspiration from popular revolutionary movements. One was directed towards constructive creation, the other towards destruction. One bore the character of utopias, peaceful, humanitarian and evolutionary plans. The other expressed itself in conspiracies, demagoguery, terrorism. The first dreamed of the liberation of society by means of economic planning. The second believed that this liberation would result from seizure of political power.

Bolshevism, Babeuf and Blanqui

Bolshevism contains many elements of kinship with the teachings of Babeuf and Blanqui, which Bernstein referred to when he characterized the destructive trends which took as their cornerstone the seizure of political power. But in the twentieth century no movement can afford to neglect state power and what might be called the creative functions of this power. On the other hand, Bolshevism, from the moment it attains power in a country, ceased to be a wing of the workers' movement and becomes the self-sufficient moving power of a totalitarian dictatorship.

Analysis of the almost half-century old history of Bolshevism leads to the conclusion that the essence of this trend is not reducible to a definite set of principles (these principles have changed and what was regarded as heresy the day before became the article of faith on the next day). It is not covered by the concept of radical tactics (Bolsheviks are capable of employing quite moderate tactics when circumstances demand it). Neither does it, finally, express itself in the position that the struggle for political power is the sole and exclusive task of the movement (all political parties concentrate their attention on the struggle for power).

The core of Bolshevism is a combination of all the above elements,

plus something else that is connected with indiscriminate use of means, poltical amoralism and total disregard of the value of the human person. In his book, Wolfe cites a number of examples from the history of the Russian Bolsheviks which illustrate this contemporary Machiavellianism.

Karl Schmidt, well-known German jurist and one of those who prepared the ideology of National-Socialism, wrote a tract in the late nineteen-twenties about the nature of politics. From his point of view, human activity acquires political character only when it is ultimately directed, if only in its most distant perspective, at the physical annihilation of the enemy. Karl Schmidt's definition is also applicable to the Bolshevik conception of politics. One is inclined to overlook this as one follows Lenin's remarkably skillful and subtle maneuvering that led him to victory in Russia.

The historian usually loves his hero. Wolfe is obviously fascinated by the founder of Bolshevism. For instance his admission of the possibility that Lenin may have believed in Malinovsky's innocence can be attributed only to this fascination.[3] If the fundamental essence of Bolshevism is kept in mind, however, many aspects of Lenin's philosophy will appear in a somewhat different light from that shown by Wolfe. Until 1917, writes Wolfe, Lenin was a democrat. Souvarine makes a similar statement. It may be added that Lenin was also a socialist and a friend of the people. But all these features in him receded to a secondary place when it was necessary to achieve success. Then the democrat Lenin did not submit to the majority of his own party and even of his faction, and in the most decisive moment of his career he disregarded the will of the Russian people and in January 1918 disbanded the Constituent Assembly, freely elected by the people.

History knows of many amoral political teachings. The uniqueness of Bolshevism consists in the fact that it grew out of the soil of the most humanitarian of contemporary social movements, the soil of socialism. But socialism, Russian as well as international, has always contained various tendencies. These were held together by their common hatred of the evils of the capitalist system.

They had different conceptions of the methods of overcoming the bourgeois regime and of the social order which is to replace it. More-

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[3] Roman Malinovsky, a Deputy to the third Duma and a strong supporter of Lenin in the social-democratic parliamentary group, was exposed later as an agent provocateur of the Ochrana. But Lenin refused to believe it. Malinovsky was executed by the Bolsheviks later, in 1918.—*Editor.*

over, in the minds of individual socialist thinkers there existed side by side contradictory trends which have found expression, in our time, in communism on the one hand, and in democratic socialism on the other.

As soon as socialism became a deciding political factor, as soon as the transformation of society became an actual, realizable task, the trends which formerly co-existed within the framework of the same organization became separate, and hostile, parties, fighting each other for domination in the labor movement. Wolfe shows, on the basis of a study of a vast body of material, how this process occurred in Russia.

THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE AND THE "LOST PEACE" — IN LITERATURE

By Vera Alexandrova

Peace has just been declared, but Soviet literature is being mobilized again. Poets and writers expound the official "credo" in verse and prose. On the eve of the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the former soldier-poet, Semen Gudzenko, gave the following picture of the international situation in the February issue of the periodical "Znamya":

China, Indonesia, Greece.
And again we hear in the air
The hoarse voice of armies—
War holds converse with the world.

And again overseas legalists
Have no care about Java on fire.
And again overseas colonels
Do business in foreign lands.

Once more Washington is equipping
A punitive crusade.
And there are no unemployed traitors,
And spies are busy again.

Scaring the Soviet reader with the threat of United States aggression against Europe and the world has become the basic task of Soviet journalism. What impression it leaves on the average man is hard to say. But one rather unexpected response is inadvertently revealed by Nikolay Virta in his last play, "Our Daily Bread." Thekla, wife of the kolhoz chairman Tikhoy, asks the secretary of the regional Communist Party committee, Rogov, newly returned from the war: "The things people will invent nowadays! There is rumor that the 'Mericans have some kind of new bomb and they say they'll kill off everybody! Tell me—did they invent it against the government, or against the people, too?" And Rogov cautiously replies to her: "Our government lives side by side with the people."

Thus, the louder the fanfare of the official "mobilization," the more intensively though silently the people think their own thoughts. And these thoughts turn out to be the same as those of the American "man in the street" or the European man of the people. They are the same bitter thoughts of how "the war was won, but the peace was lost."

But to the Soviet citizen the idea of the "lost peace" contains yet another element which is unknown to the free democratic peoples—the tragic fact that the peace has not brought him anything of what he had hoped and longed for throughout the terrible years of war: it has brought the people themselves no relief from their almost unendurable burden, no "freedom from want and fear"—none of the political changes which, during the sacrifice and strain of war, they were led to expect. Despite all the efforts of official literature to hide it, this feeling of cheated hopes and a "lost peace" weighs upon the consciousness of wide strata of Soviet society.

Of course, it cannot be openly discussed or written about. But since the feeling permeates the very air of postwar life, of Russia, the "lost peace" is talked about in covert form and colors the most diverse discussions which seemingly have no bearing on the peace issue.

It is difficult to say when this feeling first appeared. There are many indications that it arose while the war was still in progress, or, more precisely, during its second period, when victory was already in sight. Then the Communist Party, already sure of survival and coming victory, began gradually to familiarize the public opinion with the idea that a change in the domestic regime was neither necessary nor justified by the events of the war. Why indeed should anything at all be changed in the policy of the Party and why should the domination of the Party be curtailed? Because Russia allegedly had not been sufficiently prepared for the German attack and the Red Army suffered at first a major defeat and had had to make a deep retreat? And why should the people be rewarded by more political freedom and lses privations? Because they fought bravely?

But in fact, there was no defeat and no retreat. In fact, the war was won not so much by the heroism of the people, as by "the wise leadership of the Communist Party," and victory was due to the superiority of the Soviet regime and the Soviet economy.

Literary critics began to assert the superiority of *Soviet* patriotism to the traditional *Russian* patriotism on which the Kremlin had leaned during the hours of greatest peril and despair.[1]

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[1] See, for instance, the article "Socialist Man in the War for the Homeland," by A. Lavretsky in the December 1943 issue of *Znamya,* where a number of Soviet writers are attacked for having failed to make clear the difference between Soviet patriotism and the traditional Russian patriotism to which the Politburo had encouraged these same writers to appeal.

This new trend was already widely in evidence in the literature of 1945, in which a prominent place was occupied by works dealing afresh with the first period of the war but treating it now from the new point of view which stressed the "leading role" of the Communist Party during that period both at the front and behind the lines. ("The Young Guard," by A. Fadeyev.)

The majority of readers did not immediately notice this reorientation: they were still absorbed in the expectation of the changes which had been promised quite generously at the beginning of the war by the frightened rulers in the Kremlin. But already in the second half of 1945, differences of opinion became visible. They found their expression in poems of young front-line poets and later in prose and in journalistic articles.

These differences cropped up with unexpected sharpness in an incident involving F. Panferov's article, "Crocks and Potsherds," in which he made a direct attack on the so-called "ideologists" who juggled and manipulated well-known facts under the very eyes of contemporaries and participants. To these ideologists, or, as Panferov calls them, "potsherds," there exist no problems, "to them everything is clear." "Retreat, you said?—There was no retreat. There was only a planned withdrawal, to wear out the enemy.—But permit me, one argues with them, what kind of a planned withdrawal was it when the fate of the nation hung on a hair? . . . Forget it. Forget all about that,—reply the 'potsherds.'—But how can we forget about it? Can we forget that the Germans were at Stalingrad, at Mozdok, near Moscow? How can we forget the burdens shouldered by our people during the war?! Did not these heavy burdens at times make our joints crack. . . ."

When Panferov conceived his article there was some uncertainty, some struggle still apparently going on among the Communist leadership, which struggle made the publication of Panferov's retort possible. But by the end of June, 1946, the question already was decided on the highest levels. Then "Pravda" came out with a crushing blow not against the "potsherds," but against Panferov, especially for his "mechanistic" subdivision of the war into two periods—defensive and offensive, and, above all, "for his irresponsible ridicule of the correct historical statement that during the period of retreat the Red Army was wearing out the enemy's strength."

The resolution by the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party condemning the war-time writing of Zoschenko and

Akhmatova (August 13th), and the literary purge which followed, put a formal end to the discussion. But in fact, the discussion continues to this very day, though in covert and muffled form. Every new novel and even every story dealing now in retrospect with the early period of the war inevitably serves as an occasion for its renewal. And the more such a work shows genuine and unique details of that time, the greater the chance that the author will be reprimanded for "grave political errors." However, despite the dangers inherent in the theme, writers continuously return to it. During the past two years they have learned to dodge the wrath of the critics. When he is depicting the unhappy early period, each one firmly remembers that it is necessary at some point to mention the "leading role of the Communist Party." Thus in the new novels a whole gallery of ubiquitous, mysterious and wise secretaries of regional committees of the Communist Party came into being, especially in works depicting the siege of Leningrad. Those virtuous secretaries manage to "raise the morale" in the factories, supply the population with food, put out fires at night together with the tenants, even save children from the collapsing ruins of burning buildings (as in "Siege," by V. Ketlinskaya). In real life such incidents were, of course, quite possible, but for some reason they failed to find their way into the novels and stories written in 1942. Now the eternal secretary became either a necessary precautional measure with the non-entirely faithful writers, or a pious propaganda figure with the party-liners.

But somehow the characters of the secretaries did not appear convincing, not only in the works of less gifted writers. Even very talented novelists failed to produce the necessary propaganda effect. The villians of the piece impressed the reader as living and genuine figures, while the noble secretaries made an unnatural and artificial effect. The poetic truth belied the propaganda effort of the author.

Even the official critics who should have welcomed the glorification of the secretaries, were compelled to expose the "far fetched and labored" characterizations of the party heroes, and deplore the "unpleasant naturalistic details" in the description of the sufferings of starving people (as was done in reference to "Stozharovy," a novel by E. Keterli).

The rift between the official ideologists and the moods prevailing among the Soviet common people has manifested itself most vividly in an affair involving the recollections of the army physician, Olga Djigurda, "The Diesel-Motorship Kakhetia," published in the first two

issues of "Znamya" for 1948. These recollections belong to the large stream of war-time memoirs and describe the trips of a Black Sea Diesel-Motorship, converted into a military transport, during 1941-42. The ship carried troops, ammunition and provisions from the Caucasian shore to Sebastopol, and brought back the wounded. O. Djigurda served on it as a physician. Every trip was extremely dangerous, since the unloading of troops and the loading of the wounded, as well as the journey itself, were carried out under constant German air-attacks and artillery fire. Djigurda's memoirs do not pretend to any literary tsyle or even to documentation in the strict sense of the word. But they hold the reader's attention from the very first page, since they are a small section of that truth about the war which is so precious to every contemporary.

When the war began, Djigurda was in Zaporozhie, and she has remembered ever since how on the night of June 24, 1941, after registering with the War Commissariat, she stood on the bank of the Dnieper River and made a "vow" to herself: "to forget personal interests, to forget the word 'I,' to give herself completely to the service of the homeland until the day of victory, and to endure without a murmur all suffering and misfortune" that might fall to her lot. . . . Beside her stood another woman, a dentist, who was also looking silently at the infrequent, gleaming stars of the summer sky. She was thinking the same quietly and calmly: "We must forget everything. We must leave home, our families, all that is dear to our hearts, and go 'there,' to save the most important thing—our homeland."

Before Djigurda was assigned to the ship "Kakhetia," she worked in hospitals at Perekop and Chargun. The Chief of the Medical Personnel took a dislike to Djigurda and several of her colleagues. He was an extreme despot and an unintelligent man who always threatened to "transfer uncooperative elements to the ship," where they would "get a real taste of hell." His subordinates lived in constant dread of being "transferred to the ship." But when Djigurda and her colleagues finally found themselves on the "Kakhetia," they were astonished at the humane and friendly atmosphere and became warmly attached both to the ship and its personnel. Djigurda unpretentiously describes the people, their qualities and faults, their sufferings, their fears and their heroism, and this is what gives these memoirs their power to move and to impress.

But official criticism dealt severely with Olga Djigurda. In the

article, "When a Thoughtful Editor Is Lacking," (Literary Gazette, March 13, 1948), E. Knipovich expressed, of course in the name of the reader, "a feeling of disappointment" with Djigurda's story. This feeling supposedly arises in the reader because, in addition to her lack of artistic skill, the author of the memoirs "does not possess that human talent which we have felt with such joy in most of the recollections we have read about the Patriotic War," and she is unable "to see the most important and significant thing in people." Even more stern is the verdict of another critic, Lifshitz, in the April issue of "Zviezda."

However, the actual Soviet readers, in whose name both Knipovich and Lifshitz claimed to speak, did not agree with their "spokesmen": at a meeting at the Central Writers' House in Moscow, devoted to a discussion of Djigurda's Memoirs, they excitedly spoke of their impressions, and one of them, the lecturer Rostotsky, especially stressed "the absence in Djigurda's book of any beauty-parlor prettification of reality" (Literary Gazette, May 8th).

Unexpectedly, the discussion was joined by the author of the enormously successful book, "People of Pure Conscience," P. Vershigora, In his article, "About People of Experience and Their Critics" (Zviezda, June, 1948), Vershigora gave a sharp rebuttal to the official critics: "Pseudo-classic conceptions regarding Soviet people at war, the motives for their actions and encounters, have apparently developed in the critics themselves sanctimonious ideals. And now the critics react to every departure from this lacquered norm." Vershigora is most indignant at the methods employed by the "pharisaic critics" in their struggle against the genre that displeased them: they act "surreptitiously, without undue noise"; their main task "is simply to ignore the early memoirs of front-line people, or to give fleeting mention to their weaknesses and, above all, to disparage their significance." Immediately after the appearance of Djigurda's Memoirs, Vershigora points out, the editorial office of "Znamya" was swamped with letters from common readers who "warmly approved this literary work."

Vershigora asserts that the quoted fragments were chosen at random, and he confines himself to a few quotes, because all the letters are similar. Their writers, Vershigora remarks pointedly, do not suspect "how sharply their opinion differs from that of the literary critics." And he is not afraid to state the reasons for this difference: "Unwilling to prettify the events of the first, difficult, and in many ways even tragic period of the war, the author apparently provokes protest and dis-

paragement only on the part of those who evade the living truth and prefer oleographs to fearlessly true stories about the complex and often contradictory phenomena of wartime reality."

In connection with Djigurda's Memoirs, Vershigora develops his own views on the problems of literary criticism. Himself a former participant in the partisan movement, Vershigora warmly recalls the words of a certain front-line officer: *"I have spilled enough blood for our people to have a right to see their faults and failings."* Criticism must understand that it least behooves it to "teach these people moral-ethical norms, if only because the authors of these books can teach the critics themselves a great deal in this matter. Or at least because they have a right to do so."

The most interesting point in Vershigora's article is the story about "a certain highly placed conference devoted to the fate of literature about the war." At this conference one well-known writer, who spent the entire period of the Leningrad blockade in the besieged city (unfortunately his name is not mentioned) "complained, and not without cause, that he has not been able to write the truth about the days of the blockade since approximately 1944, *i.e.,* since the literary and critical channels have filled up with people who never had a taste of blockade. Every effort to depict it realistically is already branded by them as slander against the Leningrad people." It is precisely to this impossibility to write the truth that Vershigora attributes the lack of "great literature" on a necessary theme about heroic Leningrad. "Crude facts (and they are always crude, especially to those who haven't had a sniff at them) cannot be written about," he sums up. "And people are apparently still ashamed to write prettified 'little truths' which are always worse than open lies. What then is the result? The needed book about the great feat of Leningrad has not and does not come!"

Vershigora's article—under Soviet conditions—means a challenge. It will not remain without consequences. In the meantime, the Literary Gazette of July 31, 1948 carried a reply. In an article under the expressive title "Confused talk from the 'writers' tribune"; A Nikolskaya expressed her indignation concerning "Vershigora's slanderous declarations." "It is difficult to believe," she writes, "that this vicious attack upon our literature has come from the author of 'People of Pure Conscience'—a book which attracted both the readers and the critics precisely because of its 'crude truth.'" Of course, Vershigora's statement is branded as being "politically harmful."

THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE AND THE "LOST PEACE"

To people who are not directly connected with the life of the Soviet Union, both the theme and the sharpness of the controversy may seem incomprehensible: three years after victory, the Russians are arguing about the reasons why the Red Army retreated during the first months of the war, and why a vast part of Russia was occupied by the enemy. But behind this impassioned controversy there are the millions of participants in the war who were given promises during the difficult time of retreat, promises which still remain unfulfilled. By defending the truth about the war, they are passionately fighting to prevent the final transformation of the victorious war into a "lost peace."

EDUCATIONAL TRENDS IN ITALY

By Lamberto Borghi

Editor's Introduction

Educational theory in the thinking of Plato, Rousseau, Pestalozzi and Freud has always mirrored some theory of fundamental human nature. Less well understood is the fact that educational experience has always reflected most sharply the shape of social and class focus existing in a country. Lamberto Borghi's essay here is a fascinating study in the history of an experience and its tragic consequences for western Europe. Italian liberals had won Italy by 1848 and ruled the country until the first world war. Opposed to socialism, mass democracy and clericalism, the Liberals sought to build an educational structure on the basis of upholding the highest values of society and educating only the few capable of appreciating those values. Thus the differentiation between classical and vocational education became the touchstone of Italian liberalism as reflected in the thinking of Croce and Gentile. Its consequence, however, was to build an elite group and widen the gap between the desire of the mass of people for education and the upper middle class. Strangely, this distinction was supported by the Marxian Socialists. Feeling that Italy was backward industrially, they saw their main task one of creating more skills and developing industry.

The consequence of such policies was the strengthening of the authoritarian control of education. It is a piece of social history with equal relevance to the political facts of Italian life today and the contemporary discussions of American education, particularly the recent proposals to spread mass higher education and the attacks of such educators as Conant of Harvard on such proposals.

Italy's Risorgimento was due to the combined efforts of liberals and democrats. When Italy's unity was achieved, the liberals who had become the leading force of the Sardinian kingdom in 1848 obtained control of the entire peninsula. The liberals succeeded in governing Italy until the end of the first World War by assimilating or neutralizing the democratic, socialist and Catholic forces. To understand present day Italy it is important to trace the peculiar evaluation of the politics of Italian "liberals."

The meaning of the term "liberal," as it is used by the students of the history of continental Europe, differs substantially from its meaning in the Anglo-Saxon countries. "The word 'liberal' during the first three decades of the 19th century in Italy," writes Gaetano Salvemeni, "designated a man who fought for freedom against reaction." Since the

Catholic clergy was the vanguard of reaction, "liberal" meant also "anticlerical." After 1830 "liberal" came to indicate "a man who opposes at the same time reactionaries and democrats, while still remaining anticlerical." When Italy was politically unified, the "liberals" obtained control of the government. Therefore they became "conservatives," while still remaining anticlerical and antidemocrat.

During the first decade of the 20th century, the Vatican abandoned its intransigent opposition against the national regime in Italy, and the Catholics joined with the conservatives in resisting the Socialist movement. Therefore the word "liberal" came to designate "a conservative who is no longer anticlerical, and who accepts the support of the Catholics against the Socialists, leaving to the Catholics a subordinate position in this alliance." After the war of 1914-1918, the Catholics refused to remain at the service of the "conservative liberals," and formed an independent party, the Popular Party. The "liberal conservatives" became therefore staunch enemies of the "popolari" as well as of the Socialists, and when they lost all hope of being able to overcome Catholics and Socialists in a regime of freedom, they became associated with the fascists in the destruction of that regime. Therefore the word "liberal" took on the meaning of "reactionary."

During their early period of struggle the liberals, for the most part from the upper middle class, stood for the rights of the individual against the absolute state, for free enterprise against economic state control, for freedom of the mind against the tenets of religious dogmatism. Their opposition to the democrats was mainly based on their unwillingness to extend the benefits of freedom to all men at once and on their belief that progress is a slow process which will eventually embrace the entire population after a long and patient work of education and enlightenment by the upper classes. Thus they interpreted their claim for individual freedom as the right of the most cultivated and capable individuals to exercise their rule over the rest of the people.

Their attitude toward economic problems added an aristocratic tinge to their concept of liberty. They regarded the conditions of capitalist production as eternal laws inherent in nature itself. In the name of this naturally established order they opposed for a long time all attempts to enforce legislation limiting the employment of women and child labor and fixing rules on working hours and wages.

In South Italy, where the economy was mainly agricultural and society had maintained a semi-feudal character, the new liberal govern-

ment strengthened the position of the landlords in regard to the peasants, adding political and administrative control to their economic power. Since Italy's electoral system during the first decades after unification rested on restricted suffrage, based on wealth and literacy, political rights were limited to a minority of landowners and professional men. In all the South, as a government sponsored survey in 1873 remarked about the situation in Sicily, "nobody knows how to read with the exception of the tyrants and of those who look forward to becoming tyrants."

This political and economic situation relegated to the background the program of the liberals to extend freedom to the lower classes by a continuing process of education, and was responsible to a large extent for their new conservative trend.

Theoretical Justification

A theoretical justification of this retreat from freedom by the liberals was offered by the Hegelians, who regarded the psychological distinction between senses and reason as an essential dichotomy on which rested the division of society into two peoples, *i.e.,* one of which was endowed with reason and hence with an attitude to self-government and to political and social rule, and the other with senses and imagination and only fit for servile occupations. The concept that the Mind reveals itself in history led the Hegelians to regard political institutions as the highest embodiment of reason and to justify the growth of state authority, thus drifting farther and farther from the individualist position of the early 19th century.

Under these circumstances, liberal philosophy was unable to challenge seriously Catholic doctrine and to replace the influence of the Catholic Church over the Italian people. The stress of the liberals on authority and hierarchy aided the persistence of the influence of the Catholic conception, which presented the principles of hierarchy and authority in a pure and unadulterated form.

The educational system organized by the Italian liberals reflected this situation. Originally committed to a program of educational freedom which opposed both state and church intervention, the liberals abandoned this program under the impact of an offensive of Catholics and democrats, and tried to strike a balance between the claim of the Catholic Church for educational control of youth, which the Church accompanied and supported with a denial of the competence of the state in educational matters, and the democrats' advocacy of total control of education by the state.

While granting to the citizens the right to open schools and to provide by themselves for the education of their children, the liberal government created a nation-wide system of public schools, which at the secondary and higher level were free from the influence of the Catholic Church. Elementary education was left to the municipalities and remained under the control of the clergy to a large extent.

Another main feature of Italian education, common to the educational systems in all Western countries, was the division between vocational and general education, which was based on a social criterion and which increased social stratification. However, the influence of the democratic principles was embodied in the provision which enabled the pupils of vocational schools to continue their studies into high schools and certain departments of the universities.

The Socialists tried hard to raise Italian civilization "from the ledge on which it lay torpid (to use Toynbee's image) up the face of the cliff." Their challenge to the liberals to share with the workers the benefits of knowledge and power was resisted strenuously by the ruling class. Fascism was the response.

The theories of historical materialism and that of stages of capitalism proved in the long run incompatible with the aim of the Marxist Socialists to bring about a society of free and equal men. While Anarchists and utopian Socialists continued to demand with Condorcet that education should help "to establish among citizens actual equality" the Marxists contended that in industrially backward countries the primary task of the working class was to spur capitalist development in order to bring a Socialist society.

Accordingly, Socialist educators asked for expansion of elementary and vocational education to enable the workers to perfect their skills and co-operate successfully with the propertied classes in the industrial mobilization of the country. The ultimate aims of Socialism were not forgotten, but stress was laid on immediate practical results regarded as the proper means of achieving those aims.

Reformist Trend Aided Conservatives

This reformist trend, which prevailed in Italian and European Socialism up to the eve of the first World War gave new impetus and strength to the liberal-conservatives. Socialist educators joined forces with the liberals in demanding educational reforms which substantially *rejected* the democratic aspirations of the lower classes. They asked that the crisis of Italy's school system, which was caused by the influx

of the children of the lower classes into secondary schools (which had been until then attended only by the middle and upper classes), be solved by creating many new vocational schools for the newcomers and strengthening the classical schools as the seed-bed of the ruling élite.

The main lines of this reform, which was sponsored around 1910 by Socialist and democratic educators, were embodied in the educational reform which was carried out by Mussolini's first cabinet in 1923 under the direction of Giovanni Gentile and had been presented to Parliament by Benedetto Croce, Education Minister in Giolitti's cabinet in 1920-1921.

Sponsored by liberals and "popolari," this reform was strongly opposed after the first World War by democrats and Socialists, the latter having abandoned the reformist policy which they had pursued during the first decade of this century. Antonio Gramsci, then a leader of the revolutionary wing of the Socialist party, declared that those who asked for more vocational schools as a proper means of achieving the educational rehabilitation of the workers co-operated with the ruling class "in perpetuating social differences" by maintaining the workers "in the sphere of practical and immediate interests."

Giovanni Gentile summarized his educational program in the statement that, after multiplying the vocational schools for the lower income groups, the classical schools should be substantially reduced in number so as to allow to remain in them those students "who alone belong to them and who were born for them, and who alone are morally, intellectually, and economically capable of pursuing the cultural aims of the Liceo"; and Benedetto Croce announced his program by declaring that "in education we prefer small armies such as those of Athens and Sparta, which conquered Asia and founded modern civilization, to huge Xerxes' armies."

While Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto drew from their analysis of past and recent history the sociological law that the direction of society belongs to a selected élite, Croce and Gentile gave the doctrine of the élite a metaphysical foundation based on their idealistic philosophy. They conceived the essence of reality as the Spirit or the Mind which realizes itself through a process of position and composition of contrary (Gentile) or distinct (Croce) forms. The Mind is therefore essentially historical, and history is its adequate manifestation.

The contrasts and strifes which form the tissue of history are the temporal aspects of the eternal movement inherent in the Mind. Those,

therefore, who foster contrasts and strifes in history are the carriers and promoters of the spirit of the world. Gentile regarded the state as the embodiment of the Mind, and war between nations as the projection of the process of absolute reason.

As for Croce, he believed for a certain period of time that Socialism, with its stress on class struggle, was the doctrine which offered a proper interpretation of human history. He leaned toward Socialism as he himself declared, because he considered its concept of a "workers' aristocracy" leading the masses to overthrow the bourgeoisie and to transform society a safe guarantee "of the abandonment of an arithmetical or geometrical idea of equality for life which is biologically unequal and asymmetrical."

His later realization that the Socialists, with their reformist practices, had compromised with the equalitarian democratic mentality forced him to dismiss all hope in the Socialist movement. Then he embraced the idea that the protagonists of historical advancement through struggle and war were not the social classes, but the national states, and he regarded Italian and German Idealism, which had developed a dialectical conception of reality justifying opposition and inequality, as the highest theoretical achievement of Western civilization.

Fascism Expands Authoritarian Education

The conquest of Fascism over Italy's democratic and Socialist forces was accompanied in the ideological and educational field by an unparalleled sharpening and expansion of the hierarchical and authoritarian doctrine which the liberals had at least partially justified and the Socialists had not totally rejected. Seen in this perspective, the Catholic revival in Fascist Italy and the close alliance between the Vatican and the Dictatorship appear as the logical result of the imperfect awareness of liberals, democrats and Socialists of the values inherent in their philosophy and of modern civilization.

The Gentile Reform of 1923 corresponded in terms of educational organization with the defeat inflicted by the fascist squads on the Italian workers. In the same way that the workers' organizations had been shattered and that citizenship in economic life had been denied them once again, the Gentile Reform curtailed the number of the students of the lower classes who were to be admitted to the general courses of high schools, and made the technical schools, which were mainly attended by children of lower income groups, merely vocational and terminal courses.

The concessions to popular pressure made on this point by fascist ministers during the following years were wiped out by Minister Giuseppe Bottai in 1939. The Educational Charter (1939) rested on the principle that the vocational schools, as Bottai put it, "should not provide, even unwittingly, an incentive to change one's social conditions" by injecting in their students "deceptive ambitions to enter the ranks of high school students."

Parallel to this, the extension of the authority of the state to all aspects of human life, which characterized the Dictatorship, became the most striking feature of fascist education. Students were taught that the state is the embodiment of the universal and absolute spirit and that the lives of individuals achieve their full value when they are totally dedicated to promoting the expansion and greatness of the state.

The most effective resistance against totalitarianism was made by the Italian people in their refusal to identify their interests and aims with those of the state and to submit to the 'politicalization' of their entire existence. The novels of Ignazio Silone and Carlo Levi's recent "Christ Stopped at Eboli" give a vivid account of the deep-seated hostility of the rural population of South Italy to the centralized government.

The best exponents of anti-fascism gave a voice to this silent resistance of the people. While Croce, with a sharp reversion of his wartime stand, stressed the subordination of politics to morality, young anti-fascist writers, in an even sharper rejection of all Fascist tenets, denied politics any autonomous existence and identified political activity with ethic. The rights of society were upheld against the claims of the state.

The condition for the foundation and survival of society was seen in the spontaneous meeting of individuals freed from all external compulsion. Non-violence was considered the necessary counterpart of sociability. Discarding the principles of historicism and dialectic, these groups of dissenters, who were mainly connected with the Socialist and liberal-Socialist movements, advocated an education aimed at promoting the free growth of individuals and at making the economic activity of man an integral part of his personality, thus implying rejection of the separation of culture and utility.

Today, after the failure of the European Resistance to bring about an effective change in the structure of state and society, these small groups are fighting, against heavy odds, the resurgence of the authoritarian attempt to capture Italy's social life and education in an effort to resist the overpowering onslaught of Stalinists and Catholics.

THE SOVIET PARTISANS AND THE JEWS

By Solomon M. Schwarz

The partisan movement of World War II in Eastern and Southeastern Europe forms one of the most fascinating chapters of recent history. The movement involved hundreds of thousands of individuals, assumed a bewildering variety of forms; it abounded in heroic exploits and contributed substantially to the defeat of Nazi Germany. This movement, however, was not without its internal contradictions and problems, and these have received little attention to date. Unexpectedly, the Jewish question proved to be one of the problems that emerged acutely in the Soviet partisan movement in the western and southwestern parts of the USSR, where a large part of the Jewish population resided before the war, as well as in the newly-annexed regions of the Soviet Union.

In the complex cluster of questions concerning Soviet Russia, the Jewish problem has come to occupy a special place. In America, as in Europe, even among persons well-informed in public and political affairs, one often encounters instant consternation and indignation at the very mention of the existence of a "Jewish problem" in the Soviet Union. In recent years, it is true, this uninformed view has been somewhat diminished, yet it remains widespread. TheJewish question within the partisan movement constitutes, of course, only a part of the overall Jewish question in Soviet Russia. Yet, it sheds light on, and helps make understandable, the general status of the Soviet Jew.

This article is therefore devoted not so much to the general role of the Jews in the partisan movement as to relations between Jewish and non-Jewish partisans and between Jewish partisans and the non-Jewish population of the occupied regions.

In Soviet publications which deal with the partisan movement, these specific areas are usually by-passed in silence. In recounting the story of partisan exploits, both Sidor Kovpak,[1] the most widely-acclaimed

* The author wishes to thank the American Jewish Committee for permission to print this chapter from his forthcoming book to be published by the Committee.

[1] S. A. Kovpak, *Ot Putivlya do Karpat* (*From Putivl' to the Carpathians*), Moscow-Leningrad, 1945.

guerrilla commander, whose "division" operated in White Russia and Western Ukraine for more than two years, and his chief lieutenant, Petro Vershigora,[2] consistently refrained from alluding to any special Jewish problem within partisan ranks, nor do they mention Jewish participants in guerrilla fighting, save in exceptional cases.[3] Similarly, Jewish writers,[4] in discussing the Jewish resistance movement and the role of Jews in partisan activities either remain silent regarding the problem of Jewish and non-Jewish relations in the partisan movement or confine themselves to passing remarks which do not divulge any pertinent information.

The task of an independent critical study has, however, been rendered somewhat less difficult to the extent that archive material is now available. In this connection, attention centers about statements and testimony of Jewish partisans assembled in Poland by the Jewish Historical Commission (Centralna Zydowska Komisja Historyczna w Polsce), part of which are on file with the Jewish Scientific Institute—*YIVO,* in New York. Much of the eye-witness testimony refers to Eastern Polish provinces annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939, and also to original Soviet territory held by the Nazis during the war.

In recent years praiseworthy and impressive compilation of material on Jewish participation in the partisan movement was performed by former partisans in Italian DP camps and in Palestine. Jewish partisans who had participated in guerrilla fighting in White Russia and Western Ukraine managed, in sizable numbers, to be "repatriated" to Poland during the final stages of the war or shortly after. In Poland, they organized a Jewish Federation of Partisans, *Pachach* (*Partizan-Chailchaluts*), founded in Lodz in May, 1945. The majority of *Pachach* members soon moved westward, to Austria or Italy, with the purpose of proceeding to Palestine or—in a smaller number of instances—to the U. S. With them went the *Pachach* Central Historical Commission, a research body organized from the very start under the chairmanship

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[2] Petro Vershigora, *Lyudi chistoy Soviesti* (*Men Whose Consciences Are Clean*) in *Znamya,* August, 1945; April-July, 1946.

[3] Kovpak's and Vershigora's memoirs are the most informative Soviet contributions to the history of guerilla action in the Soviet West, *i.e.,* chiefly in the Ukraine, west of the Dnieper and in White Russia. There was practically no partisan movement in mostly woodless Ukraine east of the Dnieper; in the Crimea and in Northern Caucasus no Jewish problem arose in the ranks of the partisans as relatively few Jews had resided in these areas before the war.

[4] Among the contributions by Jewish writers, the following may be cited: G. Smolyar, *Fun Minsker Geto* (*From the Ghetto of Minsk*), Moscow, 1946; M. Yelin and D. Gelpern, *Partizaner fun Kaunaser Geto* (*Partisans from the Ghetto of Kaunas*), Moscow, 1948; M. Lev, *Partisaner Vegn* (*Partisans' Ways*), Moscow, 1948.

of Moshe Kaganovich, a former partisan from the township of Ivye near Lida, who is still its head.

The Commission collected an impressive body of information which Moshe Kaganovich summed up and analyzed in a bulky volume published in Rome in 1948.[5]

Kaganovich focused his study on partisan organizations which accepted guidance and support from the Red Army and Soviet authorities. The author himself displays a friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union, and he is not particularly distrustful of Soviet propaganda. This influences his presentation of facts whenever he relies on hearsay, and occasionally leads him into errors of judgment and mistakes of a factual nature. In spite of his implicit trust in the veracity of Soviet information, however, Kaganovich has retained certain independence of judgment; it was his purpose to rely chiefly on his own experience and on testimony of partisans personally known to him. At the same time, he systematically checked the available evidence there when verification was possible.

Kaganovich, however, is certainly not a dispassionate historian, nor is he free from emotional involvement and personal bias. He was a participant in the events of which he writes, and he remains a captive of impressions and moods rooted in the recent past. He took pains, however, to analyze men and events in a calm and detached way, and in major parts of his story he has succeeded markedly.

In Nazi-occupied regions the efforts of Jewish individuals, families and groups to go underground were generated by motives somewhat different from those of non-Jews. Among non-Jews, volunteers restricted themselves in the main to those who chose to abandon "normal" existence because of a desire to take part in combat. Frequently, of course, to go underground was the only way of escaping imprisonment, concentration camp or death at the hands of Nazi executioners; but survival in such cases automatically involved participation in underground activity, in most cases in guerrilla fighting. Those who were not physically fit for combat either hid or moved elsewhere where they were not known to the authorities.

Jews had to evaluate their opportunities for survival in different terms. Theirs was an inescapable alternative—either certain death or

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[5] Moshe Kaganovich, *Der Yidisher Ontayl in Partizaner-Bavegung fun Sovet-Rusland* (*The Participation of Jews in the Partisan Movement of Soviet Russia*), published by the Central Historical Commission of the Partisan Federation *Pachach* in Italy, Rome, 1948.

escape to the woods. To flee to the woods was inordinately risky, and many who did so perished. But there was no other way. This is why Jews fled with their families, with the aged and infirm and with small children. They escaped from the ghettos—at times in sizable groups, sometimes from death trains. To reach the woods was their only immediate objective; nothing else mattered.

There were thousands of such fugitives. Thus Jewish "family camps" came into being in the forests; along with these, special Jewish detachments were set up whose chief task it was to protect the family camps. The organization of special Jewish partisan units was furthered by the difficulties which young Jewish combatants often encountered when they sought to join already operating non-Jewish guerrilla companies.

Anti-Semitism Among the Partisans

Among non-Jewish partisans, there were considerable numbers of people who had gone through German prisoner-of-war or slave labor camps and for some time had been exposed to Nazi propaganda. This kind of indoctrination made itself felt on a large scale, and anti-Semitic sentiments made headway in partisan ranks; manifestations—especially in 1942 and 1943—were frequent and violent. In this regard, Kaganovich has described the "thorny way of Jewish partisans":

"To get admitted into the ranks of a Soviet fighting detachment was not an easy job. There were some Russian units which did not admit Jews as a matter of policy. They justified their policy by stating that Jews did not know how to fight and did not want to fight.

"The first requirement a Jew had to meet in order to get admitted into a detachment was to be able to produce a weapon. Many young Jews who had no means of obtaining arms thus had no choice but to join the family camps or family combat units which admitted any Jew who had managed to escape.

"Non-Jews who joined a detachment were given arms by the partisans. It happened frequently that for this very purpose a Jew was deprived of the weapon with which he originally had come to join the detachment, or he was given an inferior weapon instead of his good one. Commanders and political leaders explained these amazing acts of national discrimination by pointing to superior political considerations: a Jew [they said] has no way out, he cannot turn back; a White-Russian, a Pole, a Ukrainian still has a number of ways open—he may join the

police or the Vlasov army or he may take a job with the Germans which would be well-paid and permit him to rob the population, and to put to advantage property that was left behind by the Jews. Therefore it is necessary that everything be done to draw him into the ranks of those who fight against the Germans.

"To be just, one must note that as more Soviet arms were supplied, the detachments began to admit into their ranks able-bodied young Jews who had no weapons of their own. But still Jews remained within a vicious circle. The non-able-bodied were reproached: 'What did you come here for? Why aren't you fighting?' And the able-bodied, those who wanted to join the detachments, were told: 'So you gave your gold to the Germans, and now you want to be with us to save your hides?' Those who came at a later stage were upbraided: 'Where have you kept yourselves so far? Working for the Germans? Sleeping under a warm featherbed in the ghetto?'

"What with this attitude to Jewish partisans, it is not surprising that of those Jews (especially Russian Jews from eastern provinces) who had a chance to do so on the strength of their appearance and their knowledge of Russian, some should have concealed their Jewish descent and claimed to be Russians, Tartars, Armenians, etc.

"In particular, the family camps suffered from anti-Semitic partisans.

"When the ghetto was liquidated, Jews escaped to partisan areas. There they were ambushed by Russian partisans and robbed to the last stitch. Thus Jews from Lida who escaped from a train carrying them to Maidanek were robbed by partisans of the 'Iskra' detachment (Novogrudok district). When the family camp in Belitsa had to be transferred to a family camp near the village of Demyanovtsy, Jews were attacked en route and robbed, and some of them severely beaten, by partisans of the anti-Semitic 'Voroshilov' detachment.

"There also were instances when Russian detachments ambushed returning Jewish foraging parties and seized the food supplies which the Jews had obtained at the risk of their lives. More than once the [Jewish] detachments commanded by Belskii and Zorin were thus made victims of highway robbery, and detachment commanders did not always succeed in retrieving the spoils through appealing to the higher command of partisan troops. Often enough such happenings resulted in the loss of lives." (pp. 165 ff.)

That Jewish fugitives were blamed for escaping to the woods indi-

cates to what extent partisan groups lacked real understanding or sympathy for the Jewish tragedy. In addition, suspicion and distrust of Jewish victims of persecution were not confined to those partisans who had been subjected to Nazi indoctrination in German camps; similar attitudes were also displayed by partisans coming from Soviet surroundings. Kaganovich recalls "an October night in the Lipichi Forest in 1943," when Jewish fighters had a long talk with Soviet paratroopers who had just been dropped from Soviet planes:

"They riddled us with questions. These questions hurt and deeply perturbed us. Instead of sympathy for those few isolated individuals of large Jewish communities who had remained alive, we noticed the tendency to wound and insult us, to throw salt into our wounds. We sought to lift the curtain, we drew before their eyes the picture of the ghetto and dwelt upon those features which ought to have made them understand the tragedy of our people. . . ." (p. 70).

The efforts of the Jewish partisans failed, however, to impress the Soviet soldiers. Preconceived notions on the subject of Jews were so widespread in partisan ranks that even monstrous charges of collaborationism and pro-German espionage leveled against Jews found credence among guerrilla fighters. Kaganovich reports partisans to have "reasoned" as follows:

"How can Jews still keep alive in the Lida ghetto in 1943? Why is it that Jews do work in workshops for the Germans and for German military supplies? Doesn't this prove that the Jews are collaborating with the Germans? Perhaps the last Jewish survivors in the Lida ghetto really have a feeling of gratitude for their well-intentioned regional official, and do take to the woods in order to spy for him?" (p. 183).

Such accusations were made repeatedly. Distrust was so great that in September, 1943, a special warning against Jewish spies was inserted in an order from "higher up" circulated among partisan detachments. Even worse occurred. A group of Jewish women who had managed to escape from the ghetto in Minsk were accused of having been sent by the Germans to poison food prepared for partisans. (p. 183).

This, of course, was an extreme case. But that such occurrences were possible was due to the presence of widespread anti-Jewish feeling. Kaganovich has, in this connection, accumulated a considerable amount of material which demonstrates how often the situation of Jews in the guerrilla world was actually unbearable. There was outspoken hostility towards family camps and non-combatant escapees in gen-

eral, because they were regarded as "surplus eaters." (p. 149). There were killings of Jews from family camps and also of Jews from fighting detachments (whose arms were coveted by non-Jewish partisans) (pp. 149, 170, 177, 180 f., 185). In some partisan detachments, anti-Semitism was so virulent that Jewish combatants felt they had to get out at once, and actually did escape to other districts (p. 175). In one case (53d squad of the "Shchors" detachment, Volch'ya-Nora district), a partisan commander ordered all Jews to leave his district; many of the "expelled" were lucky to reach other districts, but a large number of Jews driven out of the area by the partisans had no choice but to return to the ghetto, where they perished. (p. 155 f.)

To judge from the material collected by Kaganovich, of which only a fraction has been recaptitulated above, the bulk of the partisan movement must have been infected by anti-Semitic bacilli.[6]

This should not be taken to indicate that facts of a different kind were absent altogether. A number of incidents reported by eyewitnesses establish that at least part of the partisan movement was prepared and willing to protect Jews. Kaganovich states that the partisan high command had been ordered by Moscow to take care of non-combatants —which may have referred only to Jewish family camps—and that the emphasis was on the rescuing of Soviet people as a fighting task of the partisan movement (p. 143). Whether such an order actually was issued is subject to doubt.[7] But even if there did not exist an order of the kind, the fact remains that Jewish family camps in a number of instances were assisted by partisan detachments. This renders the picture of Jewish life in the woods somewhat less sinister than may appear from the preceding discussion.

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[6] Ample corroboration of Kaganovitch's observations may be found in eyewitness reports collected by the Jewish Historical Commission in Poland (see affidavits of former partisans Lazar Bromberg, Benyamin Dombrowski, Josef Elman, Fima Gelfand, Abram Lerer, Yankel Reznik, and Iser Szwarc, on file with YIVO) and in partisan testimony published by the *Bulletin of the Joint Rescue Committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine,* March 1945, pp. 19f. (by ex-partisan R. K.) ; April 1945, B, p. 21 (by Abraham L.) ; May 1946, B. pp. 9ff. (by Yom-Tov M.) ; August 1947, p. 13 (by Tobia Bielski).

[7] Kaganovich does not even indicate when the order is believed to have been issued. In another case, Kaganovich not only mentioned but actually quoted an edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR allegedly issued "by the end of 1941" over the signatures of Kalinin and Gorkin and calling upon Soviet authorities to provide transportation for the evacuation of Jews from danger areas (p. 188). In actual fact, no such edict ever was issued, and the writer apparently was taken in by an apocryphal document. This makes one doubt the information relative to Moscow's alleged order about the defense of Jews by partisans.

"In the Lipichi Forest," Kaganovich relates, "there were individual Russian detachments which assigned food from their own stocks for the feeding of family camps" (p. 151). In Volhynia, where conditions in general were less unfavorable, since a considerable part of the region was under partisan control and a primitive local government machine had been set up by partisan commanders at an early stage, family camps were under the protection of partisan detachments and were supplied with food by the latter. Two such instances also were reported from the Polesye region (pp. 153 f.)

In some cases partisans are said to have invaded smaller towns in order to liberate Jews from ghettos or camps. Kaganovich mentions four military operations of this kind: in Sverzh, where the "Zhukov" detachment saved 170 Jews; in Kossovo, where some 300 Jews were liberated by the 51st squad of the "Shchors" detachment; the assault of one of Kovpak's detachments on Skalat, Galicia, where a number of Jews are said to have been freed by the partisans; and the capture of Molodechno by the "Uncle Vanya" detachment, which is said to have rescued a considerable number of Jews (pp. 189 ff.)

The facts seem well established only in regard to Sverzh, where the operation was carried out by a Jewish detachment. The Kossovo story is not quite as simple. According to Kaganovich, the squad which attacked Kossovo numbered a considerable proportion of Jews among the combatants, and these Jewish guerrillas reportedly suggested the foray for the purpose of freeing Kossovo Jews. Yet in a story published elsewhere, Dovid Leibovich, one of the Jews liberated in Kossovo, presents this exploit in a different light. According to him, about 300 partisans actually attacked the town on August 2, 1942, and succeeded in driving the Germans out. As to what then happened to the Jews of Kossovo, Leibovich relates:[8]

"After the battle which lasted four hours the partisans again took to the woods. They took along the younger people from among our [Jewish] workers. They did not consent to take along the older and more infirm Jews, and left them in the town. I and my brother went with the partisans to the woods.

"Monday morning [August 3], Germans arrived from neighboring places and they shot all the Jews that had survived."

The story of the partisan attack on Skalat is still less trustworthy,

[8] Dovid Leibovich, "Bay Kossove in Polesy" (*Near Kossovo in Polesye Region*) in *Fun Letsn Khurbn: Tsaytshrift far Geshikhte fun Yidishn Lebn baym Natsi-Rezhim,* Munich, No. 6 (August 1947) p. 50.

being apparently based on its entirety on unchecked rumor.[9] As to Molodechno, Kaganovich's reference is too sketchy to permit verification.[10]

"The Russian partisan movement helped Jews over to the Soviet side of the front line. The brigades headed by Starek, Dombrovskii, Romanov, Zheleznyak, Dyatkov and Mel'nik, which operated just behind the German lines, conveyed across the lines many thousands of Jews who, escaping slaughter, had scattered all over White Russia.

"The combined detachments under Major General Fedorov-Chernigovskii (areas of operations: Chernigov province, later Volhynia) took over from family camps in the woods more than 500 Jewish children; the detachments took care of these children, supplying them with the necessities of life. After the Red Army had occupied Sarny (Volhynia), some of these detachments broke through the front lines and shipped the Jewish children to Moscow" (p. 189).

There would seem to be a certain amount of exaggeration in these reports. If actually "many thousands of Jews" and hundreds of Jewish children had been rescued by partisan detachments, this would have left more traces in the Russian and Yiddish Soviet press, in partisan memoirs, in documents collected by the Jewish Historical Commission in Poland, or in the testimony of numerous Jews who left the Soviet Union after the war. Still, there is no reason to assume that the reports quoted by Kaganovich were completely fabricated. To some extent, they must have had a factual basis.

Even so, the overall picture reveals the prevalence of unfavorable features. In most partisan detachments, anti-Semitism either was openly displayed or persisted in a suppressed form, making Jewish par-

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[9] The capture of the town of Skalat by Kovpak's guerillas has been mentioned in the latter's memoirs, as quoted *supra* n. 190, p. 126. About the alleged liberation of Jews, however, not a single word has come from Kovpak's pen. Yet, in general, Kovpak has related his accomplishments in minute detail, painstakingly enumerating all trains derailed by his partisans, all German supply stores looted, all food stocks seized, all Germans killed, all railroad stations destroyed, etc. If it had been true that a number of Jews were rescued in Skalat, and that the atack on the city had been mapped out for this specific purpose, it is more than likely that Kovpak would have recorded the exploit. But there is not even an indirect allusion to such an attempt in Kovpak's book. Nor does Fima Gelfand, a Jewish partisan girl who spent two years with Kovpak's division and participated in the march from White Russia to Galicia, refer to any such incident (see her testimony, Affidavit No. 714 in Materials of the Lodz Archives, collection of documents of the Centralna Zydowska Komisia Historiczna w Polsce, on file with YIVO).

[10] The "Uncle Vanya" detachment is not mentioned in Kaganovich's book but this once. This would seem to indicate that no former members of the detachment were among the partisans who supplied information to Pachachs, and that the story reported by Kaganovich was based on second-hand information.

tisans feel that at any moment they might be faced with anti-Semitic utterances or practices.

Partisan Leaders and Anti-Semitism

Anti-Semitic "leanings" of the guerrilla rank and file did not escape the attention of the high command which directed the operations of the partisan movement. In a number of instances, partisan commanders had to take anti-Jewish feeling into account when making organizational and operational decisions. Kaganovich relates:

> "Knowing of the strong anti-Semitic feeling among part of the partisans, the leadership of the Soviet partisan movement considered it necessary to scatter Jews among Russian detachments so that Jews would not strike the eye nor supply anti-Semities in partisan ranks with a reason to accuse Jews of cowardice whenever a special Jewish detachment should suffer defeat in battle or be compelled to retreat for one reason or another. . . .
>
> "In actual practice, it developed that Jews, though scattered over a great number of Russian detachments, still attracted attenion and evoked hostility on the part of anti-Semites.
>
> "Jews as a rule were given the most dangerous combat assignments. Jews in Russian detachments, whether they desired it or not, were assigned to the most dangerous duty in order to avoid fostering anti-Semitic talk about Jewish combat inepititude or Jewish cowardice.
>
> "Defeat or failure suffered in combat, or in carrying out a diversion assignment by a Russian detachment, company, squad or platoon was frequently blamed on Jews. Here, too, Jews were the scapegoat. Acts of heroism committed by Jews often were ascribed to non-Jews. Conversely, the failure of non-Jews frequently were imputed to Jews. . . .
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> "During the first half of 1943, the atmosphere in some Russian detachments had become so tense with respect to Jews that Jews were afraid of going on combat duty with non-Jewish fellow combatants" (pp. 141 f.)

General conditions improved by the end of 1943 when the ranks of guerrilla fighters were swelled by more disciplined elements arriving the Soviet Union to join partisan detachments behind the German lines.

Still, the situation remained deplorable to the very end. Kaganovich says:

> "Anti-Semitism and hatred of Jews were so strong, and, at times, affected large groups of partisans and even part of the leadership in certain districts to such an extent as to make reprisals against anti-Semites difficult to take.
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> "Time and again an anti-Semitic partisan who should have been tried for a crime would be a person of special merit, who had an excellent record in the fight against the occupying power, who had to his credit many trains derailed and many Germans killed, who enjoyed the reputation of an intrepid hero. To a certain extent, detachment commanders were prone to defend and whitewash their anti-Semitic partisans, pointing to general tactical considerations and to war requirements. It is not surprising, then, that in many instances investigation of offenses committed led to nothing since it was impossible to establish who actually had perpetrated the offense.
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> "Responsible leaders of the partisan movement and emissaries of the [Communist] party explained all this as follows: There is a war on, nothing can be done right now. It is impossible to plug up the source which feeds anti-Semitism. This is not the time to settle accounts. They [the anti-Semites in partisan ranks] valiantly fight against the occupiers; let's not hinder them. Under the prevailing conditions of life in the woods, it is difficult to maintain strict discipline with such an enormous mass of people. There will come a day when they will have to pay for everything (pp. 186 f.)

Civilians and "Forest Jews"

An important source of anti-Semitic feeling in partisan ranks was in the spread of anti-Semitism within the civilian population, *i.e.*, among the farmers, in the districts where the partisans operated. Partisans naturally lived "off the land," that is to say, at the expense of farmers in near-by villages, who felt the impact of this additional requisitioning of food all the more acutely since they already had been subjected to repeated requisitioning, compulsory delivery and outright confiscation of food by German occupation authorities. Says Kaganovich:

"The peasant was caught between hammer and anvil. If he failed

to deliver his 'quota' to the Germans, his farm was set afire and he was killed as an alleged 'partisan.' On the other hand, the partisans, using force, robbed him of everything they needed. . . . Two and a half years of partisan movement devastated the peasant economy in partisan districts. In the Lipichi Forest, there were villages where there was left, on the eve of liberation, just one cow for every four or five farms, one horse for every two or three farms" (pp. 68 f.)

As far as requisitioning by combat detachments was concerned, the farmers put up with infringements upon their property, feeling that the fight against the Germans justified the sacrifice. With respect to Jewish family camps, however, whose inhabitants were not engaged in actual combat, a far more hostile attitude made itself evident. The farmers bitterly resented that their cherished belongings—not only food but also shoes and clothing, even women's dresses—should be taken by force for the benefit of Jewish "civilians"; their resentment turned against Jewish detachments in charge of supplying family camps in particular. Under such circumstances, the seed implanted by German anti-Semitic propaganda sometimes bore ample fruit among the local farm population, and this in turn markedly strengthened anti-Semitic leanings among partisans, who in many cases were bound by solid ties to the local peasantry.

Without sufficiently probing the specific causes of this tragic blossoming of anti-Semitism in the course of the desperate fight against Nazi occupation, Kaganovich cites a multitude of instances of anti-Semitic manifestatons emanating from the local population. The hostile attitude of the surroundings aggravated the miserable conditions of Jewish life in the woods, especially in the case of Jewish non-combatants, and contributed towards increasing the appalling number of casualties. The death rate among Jews hiding in the woods was enormous, due to privation and exposure, raids and punitive campaigns carried out by the Nazis (with the collaboration of Ukrainian, Russian and other hirelings due also to the misdeeds of bandits who in those years flocked together in the woods and partly even succeeded in infiltrating organized detachments of combatant partisans. Kaganovich states:

"Of the Jews who through superhuman efforts succeeded in escaping from the ghetto in Western White Russia and Ukraine, only a very small fraction lived to see the liberation. From the ghetto in Dzhetl some 800 Jews had escaped to the Lipichi Forest. Of these, only 250 are alive today. Of the more than a thousand Jews from the ghetto in

Pruzhany who reached freedom, not more than one-hundred have remained alive.

"A considerable part of the Jewish population had managed to escape from Volhynian cities and from Kamen'-Kashisk, Tutchin and Sernik in the Polesye region; of them, only isolated individuals are alive today. In the city of Mir 180 Jews fled from the ghetto, but only 40 of them remained alive" (p. 280).

The proportion of casualties among Jewish partisans was substantially lower. Kaganovich estimates the total number of Jewish partisans in White Russia and Western Ukraine at about 10 to 11,000; of these, some 3,000 were killed in battle (p. X.)

Jewish Partisans After Liberation

The victorious advance of the Red Army signified liberation for the inmates of Jewish family camps who had survived the years of hiding in the woods. But new tribulations even then awaited Jewish partisans. After liberation they became subject to national discrimination in a new, peculiar form. Kaganovich reports:

"Immediately after liberation Jewish partisans were drafted into the Red Army advancing towards Germany. There were instances when after the demobilization of partisan detachments practically all Jews were sent to the front (detachments 'Ordzhonikidze,' 'Red Guard,' 'Victory,' etc.) . . . From non-Jewish detachments, as a rule, only those were sent to the front who originally had served in the German *Wehrmacht* and who had not come to the woods before the second half of 1943, in short, those who had to make up for their betrayal of the homeland.

"Partisans in civilian clothes, with guerrilla weapons, not trained for such combat conditions, unfamiliar with the tactics of open fighting, were thrown into advanced lines. . . . A few who 'luckily' became heavily disabled, have stayed alive. Almost all others perished in the battles near Volkovisk, Bialystok and Lake Narev" (pp. 281 f.)

After three years of such discouraging experiences in the ranks of partisan troops in White Russia and Western Ukraine, most Jewish partisans were so bitter and so deeply impressed by the feeling of belonging to a separate national group that the prospect of living under Soviet rule became repugnant to them as a matter of course. As soon as the Soviet government permitted "repatriation" to Poland, most of these veterans of guerrilla warfare, many of them decorated and awarded

medals for special valor by the Soviet government, hastened to avail themselves of the chance to leave the Soviet Union. To quote Kaganovich once again:

"In the woods the Jewish partisan had had to fight also against anti-Semitic, biased partisans. Not for a single moment did he have a chance to forget that he was a Jew. He was constantly reminded of it. . . . Seldom has national awareness been as strong among Jews as it was among the partisans in the woods. It is no accident that the partisans were the first to register for repatriation—with a view to reaching Palestine, building a home of their own and, if they had to give their lives at all, giving them for their own people" (p. 185).

Kaganovich may have overstressed the Palestine-oriented purposiveness in the psychology of Jews fleeing the Land of the Soviets; many of those trying to escape at any cost had rather vague notions as to the destination to which the exodus would lead them. The major consideration apparently was the desire to leave the places of so many disappointments and pain. The mass exodus of former Jewish partisans who had fought on the Soviet side may be taken as one of the most eloquent expressions of the tragic situation in which Soviet Jews find themselves.

POLAND:
THE BETRAYED ALLY

By Boris Dvinov

When, after the German attack on Russia, the Russo-Polish agreement was signed by Sikorski and Maiski, Britain's Foreign Minister, Eden, said to Sikorski, "I also desire to assure you that His Majesty's Government do not recognize any territorial changes which have been effected in Poland since August, 1939." This proud statement sounded very encouraging but its flaws became soon evident.

Allied policy was almost constantly directed by fear of the ever present possibility of Stalin's betrayal. In the first months of war, when the German armies were flooding Russia, the English and the Americans were afraid that in face of the impending disaster Stalin would repeat Brest-Litovsk and conclude a separate peace with Hitler.

After Stalingrad the Allies feared that Hitler would conclude a separate peace, or even an alliance, with Stalin. Later a new concept was added—that of educating and taming the beast by giving in to him on all issues and assuring him that he is "such a good boy." Following the Casablanca conference, therefore, Washington and London were able to give but one advice to the Polish Government which was in effect, "Keep your shirt on." (Mikolajczyk, p. 24.)

Now, of course, everyone understands that Stalin never intended to permit the rebirth of an independent Poland, but at that time it was considered improper to express such suspicions toward "our great ally," who had just honored the Atlantic Charter with his signature. Stalin, "the realist," laughed in his sleeve and awaited his opportunity.

This soon presented itself when the Germans opened the Katyn graves, containing the bodies of thousands of murdered Polish officers, and pronounced it a Russian deed. Sikorski requested an investigation by the International Red Cross. This was the least he could do, for, as he himself knew, in this case the German accusations were only too well founded.

Stalin was "offended" and broke off diplomatic relations with the Polish Government. Heaven knows how many stones were cast at the time from all sides upon the hapless Polish Government for its "unheard of lack of tact." It is a satisfaction to state that at that moment

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* Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, *The Rape of Poland.*
Jan Ciechanowski, *Defeat in Victory.*

the Russian Social-Democrats were the *only* group to recognize, and to state publicly, what was to be so prophetically foreseen, two years later, by Churchill in his letter to Stalin, recently published.

On April 29, 1943, the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party's Delegation Abroad declared:

"The break of diplomatic relations between Russia and Poland indicates a sharp strengthening in Moscow of a trend toward the complete liquidation of an independent Poland and of its tantamount transformation into a vassal state. The next step of the Soviet Government, after a withdrawal of recognition from the Sikorski government, will probably be the establishment in Moscow of a 'national' government which will prove an obedient tool in the hands of the Stalinist dictatorship.

"Such a policy toward Poland, evolving logically from the Stalinist dictatorship's policy—ever since 1939—toward its smaller and weaker neighbors, creates not only a dangerous division in the midst of the United Nations, laying ground for serious complications, but also undermines all hope for the establishment of a new European and world order."

Condemning this, the Delegation Abroad points out in the same resolution that "such a policy finds no justification in Russia's national interest."

Unlike the Russian Socialists, foreign governments were unable to see the connection. Their diplomats complained, but Stalin was implacable. Indeed, how could they suppose, even for a moment, that he had committed, practically with his own hands, the horrible Katyn crime!

Now, Mikolajczyk, who had learned from a Russian officer exactly what took place, relates it in his book (p. 41). In the sad days when the Germans were advancing on Russia, and the question arose what to do with the tens of thousands of Polish officers taken prisoner by the Russians, Stalin with his own hand, on his personal stationery, signed an order consisting of one word only, "Liquidate." But the Soviet Nero did not have the courage to admit openly his responsibility for the crime. At first, when questioned about Katyn he avoided giving a direct answer, and then chose to become "offended."

From that time on the war began to lose its ideological character. At that point began the period of disgraceful appeasement of Stalin, with the great democracies giving in, step by step, to Soviet blackmail. It was not to end for a long time to come. Moreover, not daring to

admit openly to their people the actual state of affairs, they began a period of shameful "deviations from the truth," spiced with the standard empty phrase that "Poland will be strong, free and independent." This well known tune was heard continually from the "Big Three," while Poland was being violated.

On July 8, 1943, on the eve of the Moscow conference, Churchill assured Mikolajczyk, "I will fight for the freedom of Poland, and I will never cease fighting for it" (p. 41). As we all know, with victory already in sight, the results of the Moscow conference were triumphantly presented by both the press and by Cordell Hull in the United States Congress. Meanwhile, Ambassador Ciechanowski relates, "in my talks with both the State Department officials and with persons close to the White House, I saw that, contrary to their official enthusiasm, their private view of the conference was one of extreme pessimism."

Harry Hopkins, one of the chief cooks in this political kitchen, is claimed to have said: "We are in despair about the Moscow conference." But when Ciechanowski asked him why then all this display of enthusiasm, Hopkins replied with a smile, "Perhaps because we want to show the Soviets that we harbor no suspicions of their conduct." President Roosevelt, though, kept assuring everyone that "Harry gets on like a house afire with Stalin; in fact, they seem to have become buddies." (Ciechanowski, pp. 230-7).

Allied diplomacy entered upon the well beaten path of deceit and self-deceit. As we now know, at Teheran Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to Stalin's demands for the Curzon line as the future eastern boundary of Poland. This was kept a secret from the Polish Government, and so, even after Teheran, Eden told Mikolajczyk:

"I share the Prime Minister's view that Stalin will not try to annihilate Poland, or incorporate it into the Soviet Union. But it is obvious Stalin's demands center around the establishment of the Curzon line as the future boundary between his country and Poland. Naturally, we agreed to nothing in this respect. We were not empowered to do so either by the British Government or by your own" (p. 48).

At the outset of 1944 Churchill returned to London and informed Mikolajczyk that:

"The British Government takes the view that Poland must be strong, independent, and free," and then quickly added, "from the Curzon line to the Oder."

Finally Churchill declared with considerable irritation: "Mr.

Mikolajczyk, you must understand that Great Britain and the United States will not go to war in order to defend Poland's eastern border" (p. 51).

Here the mental change effected by the war years became obvious. Churchill forgot that Great Britain declared war on Hitler precisely because Polish borders were being threatened, and that his statement was a direct contradiction of both the letter and the spirit of the Anglo-Polish agreement of August 23, 1930. (L. Honigwill, "Legal Aspects of the Polish Question," *International Postwar Problems,* Vol. 2, No. 9, April, 1945).

"Remember," Churchill continued, "the situation is grave. If you do not act quickly, I cannot be responsible for anything that might take place" (p. 52). Here Mikolajczyk also displayed a prophetic gift—long before Churchill—and replied:

"Let me tell you that this will be a test case. Don't you see, Mr. Prime Minister, that the Soviet Union's aim is not only to take the eastern half of our country but to take all of Poland—all of Europe."

On February 22, 1944, upon his return from Teheran, Churchill told Parliament:

"I took occasion to raise personally with Marshal Stalin the question of the future of Poland. . . . It was with great pleasure that I heard from Marshal Stalin that he, too, was resolved upon the creation and maintenance of a strong, integral, independent Poland as one of the leading Powers in Europe. He has several times repeated this declaration in public, and I am convinced that it represents the settled policy of the Soviet Union."

On April 9, 1944, he repeated to Mikolajczyk:

"I still believe in the Curzon line, but I will not rest until I see a free and independent Poland. Don't worry. Poland will emerge from this war strong and independent."

"Much will depend on your attitude, Mr. Prime Minister," replied Mikolajczyk.

To this Churchill answered, "I've got enough to do being responsible to Britain."

Don't these words show best what lay at the bottom of all of Churchill's actions? He was ready to sacrifice everything to the interest of Great Britain, as he understood it at the particular moment. Perhaps he had to act that way, that was his proverbial "realism," but his gift of prophecy was not displayed on this occasion.

After the talk with Churchill, Mikolajczyk had a meeting with Roosevelt. The same words were repeated: "Poland must be free and independent. . . . Stalin is a realist . . . but of one thing I am certain—Stalin is not an imperialist. . . ." And then he added, "I haven't acted on the Polish question because this is an election year. You as a democrat understand such things. You know, I mentioned the matter of our forthcoming American elections to Stalin, and he just couldn't comprehend what I was talking about. . . . In all our dealings with Stalin we must keep our fingers crossed. . . . But don't worry—Stalin doesn't intend to take freedom from Poland . . ." (pp. 59-60).

And then, — Stalin provoked the Warsaw uprising only to betray it. Churchill raged. But even here he did not fail to repeat, as though to hypnotize himself:

"Marshal Stalin has repeatedly declared himself in favor of a strong, friendly Poland, sovereign and independent. In this our great eastern Ally is in fullest accord with His Majesty's Government and . . . in the fullest accord with the United States" (p. 69).

On the 2nd of October Warsaw fell and on the 12th, under pressure from Roosevelt and Churchill, Mikolajczyk flew to Moscow, in order to "smooth out relations" with "our great eastern ally." And here took place a tragi-comic, almost Gogol-like scene. When the conversations about the Curzon line began to annoy Molotov, he suddenly interrupted the proceedings and announced:

"Why all this bickering, when all this was decided upon long ago at Teheran, and both Churchill and Roosevelt had given their consent to it." Silence reigned. The stricken Mikolajczyk looked at Molotov, then at Harriman, finally at Churchill. Ambassador Harriman looked steadily at his shoes. Finally, Churchill said quietly, "I confirm this." Unfortunately, it is impossible to give here a detailed account of the disgraceful scene.

At his last meeting with Mikolajczyk in Moscow Churchill shouted:

"I shall tell Parliament that I have agreed with Stalin. Our relations with Russia are much better than they have ever been. I mean to keep them that way. . . . This is crazy! You cannot defeat the Russians . . ." (p. 94).

"You settled our fate at Teheran," replied Mikolajczyk.

"Poland was *saved* at Teheran. Unless you accept the frontier you're out of business forever," he cried. "The Russians will sweep through your country and your people will be liquidated. You are on

the verge of annihilation. . . . You are *bound* to accept the decisions of the great Powers" (p. 98).

This was Churchill speaking—Churchill, champion in the fight against Chamberlain and Munich. . . . Just as the latter so did Churchill achieve his objective! The "Curzon line" was agreed upon and power was transferred to the "Lublin Committee" with Wanda Wasilewska at the helm. The result, as Churchill himself has confessed, was also not unlike Munich.

Poland was violated. Mikolajczyk went to Stalin and begged him to become Poland's "eternal benefactor" and leave at least Lemberg to her. Stalin was inexorable. Instead he declared:

"Poland is fortunate that I am not asking for more. In 1914 we were much further to the west" (p. 99).

Stalin announced that he is trying to unite Ukrainians and White Russians, and the Father of Nations said, quite calmly, that he had ordered the execution of 20,000 Ukrainians who had been collaborating with the Germans. "We have put another 200,000 Ukrainians in our army. Everything is settled."

Next a truly unbelievable dialogue took place. Mikolajczyk inquired whether Poland will become Communist.

"No," Stalin said, "absolutely not. Communism does not fit for the Poles. They are too individualistic. Poland's future economy should be based on private enterprise. Poland will be a capitalistic state. . . . There is no middle system. . . . What is not Communism is capitalism."

Mikolajczyk: "Will you order the Communist Party in Poland not to seek power through revolution after the war? . . ."

Stalin: "I will order that. . . . Poland will not be disturbed by fratricidal fights. But there are certain people—both Left and Right—that we cannot allow in Polish politics."

"But Marshal," protested Mikolajczyk, "one cannot dictate who will not be in public life—if the person's party is behind him."

"Stalin," reported Mikolajczyk later, "looked at me as if I were indeed a lunatic and ended the conference" (pp. 100-101)..

And after all this, on October 27, Churchill said in Parliament:

"Although I do not underrate the difficulties which remain, it is a comfort to feel that Britain and Soviet Russia and—I do not doubt—the United States, are all firmly agreed to the recreation of a strong free, independent, sovereign Poland. . . ."

We find the same words in Roosevelt's letter to Mikolajczyk, dated October 26:

"The United States Government stands unequivocally for a strong, free and independent Polish State. . . ."

While these speeches were being made and letters were being written, Poland's existence as an independent state was already over.

With the end of war came an end to Churchill's enthusiasm, and in June 1945, he told Mikolajczyk:

"I am more pessimistic than you are. I am pessimistic about the future of all of Europe, as well as Poland . . . the Russians will come to the Elbe and perhaps to the Rhine and establish themselves between our two countries. They are already established in Yugoslavia. They won't agree with us about the future of Austria. Nobody knows where it will end."

After some thought he added:

"The democracies are fighting well, but when they stop fighting, they will want to go to bed and rest. They most certainly won't fight Russia, but what Russia will do—nobody knows. . . . Nobody can foretell the future of Europe."

"We are finished with the Germans. But there is a new power in Europe—Russia. Nothing but war will make her retreat. But the democracies do not want war, and therefore, there will be no war."

"The next time I see Stalin," he concluded, "I am going to tell him I don't believe anything he says."

* * *

In concluding his book, Mikolajczyk calls for an organized attack by the democratic world upon Communism:

"The mighty longing for freedom lies in the hearts of 300 million people living under the yoke of Red fascism. . . . Can countries subjugated by Communism liberate themselves without outside help? My answer is a decisive NO. . . . The counterwave can, and must, break down the prison bars, not only of the nations behind the Iron Curtain, but also of the enslaved people of the Soviet Union itself!"

Postwar experience has demonstrated beyond dispute that a policy of living behind a palisade belongs to the realm of fantasy, and that there will be no peace in the world until Russia becomes a free democratic country. We are united by a common goal and our struggle should be common also. The freedom of Poland and of all nations within the Soviet sphere, is impossible without a free Russia.

GREECE: LEGEND AND REALITY

By Manolis Korakas

Greece's destiny is determined by the policies of the two great antagonists, the United States and the Soviet Union. This is the result of World War II, which reduced Greece to economic ruin, subjected it to foreign occupation, revolution, and civil war. The key to the social psychology of the Greek people today lies in the economic conditions and in the character of the revolutionary movement in Greece.

Her economic position is greatly affected by the soil and the geographic location of Greece. The development of the Near East has given her inhabitants the opportunity to engage, as in antiquity, in navigation, commerce, and migration. Agriculture is insufficient to feed her own population, and only in certain products like tobacco, raisins, and figs, does Greece have goods for export.

The agrarian reform of 1922, which redistributed the landed estates and church holdings, has resolved the agrarian problem without, however, relieving the shortage of arable land or the minute size of plots. The yield per acre of Greek agriculture is the lowest of all of southeastern Europe.

Nor do the merchant marine, emigration, and foreign loans suffice to raise the national income to adequate levels. The economic structure thus sets the limits of social and political opportunity. It gives rise to a social parasitism, peculiar to Greece, which stems from the paucity of the means of production, which are unable to employ productively and feed a population which exceeds the demographic optimum.

People are therefore obliged to turn to other activities, such as exchange, brokerage, transportation—occupations which add little to the productive wealth of the country. On the contrary, they merely burden agriculture and industry and reduce the workers' and peasants' share of income. In this manner too an accumulation of surplus capital becomes impossible.

The hypertrophied social mechanism thus consists of a mass of small merchants, resellers, middlemen, clerks, as well as persons engaged in the liberal professions. While it was at first economic attraction that

drew people to these occupations, the non-productive jobs, as in the bureaucratic system, now themselves attract the unemployed and precipitate the flight from the countryside. The lack of productive capacity forces a mass of homeless people to live at the expense of the values created in agriculture and industry and to absorb rents, commissions, and salaries in parasitic fashion.

On the other hand, the geographic position of Greece places it at the crossroads of international intercourse. Greece is the key to the coveted access of the Balkan states and Russia to the Mediterranean. During the long struggle over the "Eastern question" there arose in Greece a russophile and an anglophile orientation; early in this century, a third, pro-German orientation made its appearance, temporarily bringing about a coalition between the British and Russian protagonists. The first World War changed this situation but little, for Russia's place was then taken (with Bolshevik encouragement) by renascent Turkey. It was only during the second World War that this precarious balance was vitally upset. And now, for the first time, Greece's northern borders face a compact bloc of Soviet-dominated powers.

Greece's economic dependence on the outside world, the poverty of the country, and the interrelation of the Great Powers, therefore, dictate her political orientation.

The Social and Political Superstructure

Since the bourgeois revolution of 1909, Greek capitalism has grown, yet has failed to bring about the emancipation of the masses of the people. The Liberal party, under Venizelos, did embark on an ambitious program of national and social renovation and did enact a comprehensive system of labor legislation. Yet because of the absence of a strong labor party or of a trade-union movement these reforms have remained a dead letter. After the first World War, Greece was almost perpetually in the throes of political crises: from 1915 to 1923, over the issue of monarchy vs. republic; from 1923 to 1935, over the policies of the republic; from 1936 on, under the military dictatorship of General Metaxas and the restored monarchy; and finally, under the German occupation.

The middle-class found its political expression in two parties—the progressives flocking to the Liberal party, and the conservatives to the Popular party of Tsaldaris. Until recently, the labor movement was exceedingly weak. The industrial and political awakening of Greek

labor dates back to 1918, when the Socialist Labor party and the Confederation of Trade Unions were created. The World War and the Russian Revolution were instrumental in bringing about this development. The result, however, was that Greek Socialism was not actually the creed of a conscious vanguard of responsible Socialists, who would use their experience and shape their policies in accordance with local needs.

Until 1922, the Socialist Labor Party strove to combine responsible educational and organizational work with the obvious revolutionary opportunities of the postwar era—a policy that found its climax in the resolutions of the February, 1922 Conference and has come to be known, after its leader, as Georgiadism. Yet under the influence of militant left-wing elements, the party soon espoused a frankly Communist orientation. Georgiadis and Sideris were among those who, accused of "opportunism" and "social-democratic deviation," left the party.

A parallel effort to form another socialist party was made under the leadership of Yannios. Despite strenuous efforts, it never exerted more than symbolic influence and, for some time, had strongly syndicalist tendencies. Its importance was due in large measure to its recognition by the Socialist International.

In 1924, an extreme leftist faction left the Communist party and set up the Archiomarxist movement (after its publication, *Archives of Marxism*), which has remained uncompromisingly opposed to Stalinism.

In the mass migration and socio-political crises which marked the interwar period, both the labor parties and the trade-union movement steadily lost ground, yielded to extremists, and left the masses without a voice or representation of their own.

Occupation Engenders Revolt

The German occupation led to the complete disintegration of the economic life of Greece. No branch of its activity was spared. Quantitatively and qualitatively, the yield of Greek agriculture dropped, and the output was increasingly inadequate to feed not only the urban but even the rural population. At the same time, industrial production took an even greater dip, with the blockade depriving the country of raw materials and fuel. Manpower scattered because of famine. Only factories working for German war production continued to operate. By the end of the war, both the number of industrial workers and industrial production were near the twenty per cent mark of the prewar figures.

The destruction of the transportation network and the merchant marine was almost equally staggering. Moreover, the Germans pillaged and confiscated indiscriminately.

But the issuing of immense amounts of inflationary paper currency hid the stupendous pauperization of the country: the amount of money in circulation rose from 12 billion drachmas at the outbreak of war to 1,617,556 billions in 1945! Finally, famine, undernourishment, forced labor, and executions cut the population from 7.5 to 6.6 millions. In effect Greece—one of the victors of the war—was one of its worst victims.

The social structure of Greece inevitably collapsed in the wake of such a gigantic transformation, which created an amorphous, hungry, impoverished mass, living far from their places of employment, pushed into black-market dealings, vagabondage, partisan activities, and even support of quisling governments.

At the same time, the intermediary capitalist—*i.e.*, the commercial capitalist—gained a specific weight far greater than his importance. Traditional class divisions all but disappeared, and for the first time in Greek history there occurred something tantamount to an expropriation of the middle class.

This social decomposition and destruction of the productive apparatus transformed the nature of the social and political struggle. What united the heterogeneous populace was something that had also been in evidence after the first war and had been called "consumers' communism," *i.e.*, the common interest in survival by means of distributing the available goods: this was the only bond uniting the varied elements. It is therefore not surprising that this mentality should be characterized by a lack of understanding of the necessity for social production and social demands as well as the preponderance of consumers' over producers' conceptions.

The deep crisis which Greece is passing through is marked by the deception and the political immaturity of the masses, by their failure to respond to this fact by creating new means of political struggle. Under the occupation for the first time a popular movement arose, governed by two sets of feelings: the desire for national liberation and a confused striving for social justice. The economic crisis gradually turned into a political crisis, affecting every layer of Greek society. As a result, old concepts which had seemed deeply rooted, disappeared as easily as the vested interests of their advocates; mentality and economic status changed at an almost equal pace.

The interrelation of social forces was radically affected by the aspirations of a tacit coalition that included various social strata—state officialdom war veterans, white-collar workers. It became the principal level of the movement under the occupation, increasingly isolated from the masses of the people. In the end, these vestiges of the old classes managed to attain virtual autonomy in all the domains of social life, without any concern for the popular masses.

This was especially so because the old parties, inactive during the war, lost their roots in the population, and the leaderless masses sought new symbols and organizations to rally around. The population therefore turned not only against the occupation but also against the old political system. The National Front of Liberation—the EAM—at that time gave best expression and most effectively rallied the desperate and determined lower strata for action.

While its cadres were being formed under Communist leadership from among intellectuals, state employees, and others, the EAM recruited its followers in all layers of society. The EAM was truly a popular movement of national and economic bankruptcy, enjoying the support of unemployed workers, displaced peasants, idle physicians, workless lawyers, ruined rentiers, confused petty-bourgeois. The terror of enemy occupation, the phenomenon of "consumers' communism," the crisis of passivity, and the absence of a critical spirit were all factors in shaping its character.

Revolt and Civil War

Liberation found Greece economically ruined, socially anarchical and politically confused. In a spirit of overinflamed passions, the armistice was understood by all concerned to be merely a temporary postponement of social and civil strife.

In the absence of the traditional bases of class struggle, the conflict shifted to groups and factions for whom passion, vengeance, and armed warfare were the deciding arguments. It was in this situation that the Accord of Liban resulted in the formation of a "government of national unity," supported by all the parties, which, however, recognized the government as a strategic and temporary maneuver and not as a national necessity. The Communists, on the one hand, were following the tactics of cooperation in vogue after Teheran; while the bourgeois parties, on the other hand, were in large measure motivated by their desire to assure the return of Greek troops from abroad. The position

of the EAM was considerably strengthened by the spontaneous enthusiasm of the population of Athens and the suburbs immediately following the liberation.

While the people lived in a spirit of exhilaration, expecting a miracle that would rescue them from privation, the government was already splitting into two blocs fighting for power: one backed by the smalled armed force of the government, the other commanding the strong ELAS, the military arm of the EAM, which in effect dominated the entire country.

The Communists became increasingly restive as the non-Communists recovered. Their naive concept of class struggle had led them to anticipate the total disappearance of reactionary, and generally capitalist, elements. With the liberation and economic recovery these social and political forces, which the Communists had long considered dead and buried, reappeared on the stage.

Among the bourgeois parties, the Liberals favored a republic, whose restoration was contingent on a coalition between them and the Communists. Yet, by their own policy, the Communists maneuvered themselves into complete isolation and thus opened the way to the restoration of the monarchy. By December, 1944, there was a Communist organization, military and political, prepared for any eventuality. And, it cannot be denied, the majority of the population did expect a radical transformation of their livelihood, holding political views that were as naive as their economic sustenance was primitive.

While the Communists held five seats in the cabinet, their private army was ready to strike against the government. The modern state cannot tolerate the existence of private armies for any length of time. In other countries where such armies had arisen as a result of the occupation or defeat, they were either dissolved or absorbed into the regular army. But in Greece the ELAS had acquired a psychology which made it believe that its force alone was an assurance of desirable political change. It was this reliance on extra-political means that ultimately led to its banditry and to the Markos government.

Moreover, Greece was ignorant of the fate the Great Powers had prepared for it. Yet the December uprising was the first attempt of Soviet policy to expand beyond the sphere agreed upon among the Big Three and to push into the Anglo-American "sphere." December thus marked a bloody caricature of a social uprising, and the party that led it conducted it under the exclusive slogan of "Down with the English,"

appealing to the basest instincts of an impatient and exasperated populace. Acts of terrorism, mass execution, seizure of hostages highlighted this revolt, which was closer to the medieval than to the modern, socially-conscious type of uprising. Nor was there any "socialist" content in the slogans launched by the Communists.

The only effective force opposing the insurgent EAM was the British army. It was not the first time that a foreign army was used to squelch a domestic uprising; in this case, however, the British intervention not only led to the disarmament of the ELAS (Varkisa Agreement of February, 1945), but, after their defeat, also saved the extreme left from physical extermination. Surviving in a state of severe repression, the Communists failed to learn the lessons of their failure; on the contrary, they subsequently extolled their greatest defeats and shortcomings as victories. . . .

The unreconstructed attitude of the Greek extreme-left and the Soviet stand on the Greek question led to the Communists' boycott of the national elections in March, 1945. This was the prelude to a new recourse to armed force and the resumption of civil war.

Civil War and Intervention

After December, the Communists lost a good part of the popular support which the EAM had previously enjoyed. Moreover, the end of inflation, the gradual resumption of normal economic relations and the improvement in living conditions acted as a brake on Communist popularity. Furthermore, the repressions which followed the uprising and the economic consolidation led to a revival of the rightist parties, and the monarchists-rightists proved to be the beneficiaries of a counter-swing in popular psychology after the atrocities of the insurrection. At this time, however, the British forces could have brought enough pressure to bear to arrest the trend toward the extreme right.

If at first the Communists depicted their policy as "self-defense," it now became more and more a military intervention of the northern neighbors of Greece—Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria—, an operation in which war material and bases have been supplied from abroad, while the Greek Communists furnish cannon fodder. The alignment of forces in this merciless, uncompromising struggle does not follow the classical models of class polarization.

Nor would it be proper to speak of the present Greek regime as one of outright counterrevolution; more exactly, it is one of reactionary

tendencies, but including both the center and the right wing. Furthermore, it must be stressed that Communist behavior has, so to speak, made respectable and provided a rationale for the reactionary trend, which cannot become one of genuine counterrevolution because of both the presence of Anglo-American pressure and the intrinsic impotence of the morally and politically bankrupt Greek bureaucracy.

It is obvious that the Greek problem has fundamentally become an international concern, one of whose facets is the destiny of Macedonia and the outlet of the Soviet satellites to the sea. As the official Soviet *History of Diplomacy* declares,

> "Long before Machiavelli, the exploitation of dissension and internal trouble in the country that is to become the target of aggression, already constituted a keystone in diplomatic science. . . . Diplomacy has always sought to accelerate the decomposition of the enemy camp by intensifying the clash of national conflicts within the enemy country."

Moscow has acted faithfully in accordance with this concept.

The Future of Greek Progressivism

At present the major spokesman of the right wing is the Popular party of Tsaldaris and its satellites, Zervas, Gonatas, and Tourkovasilis. It is reactionary in its domestic policy and oblivious to the commands of international necessity. Under the mantle of anti-Communism it engages in the most shameless exploitation of the population.

The parties of the republican center, around Sophoulis' Liberal party, have been handicapped by their wavering foreign policy in the past. Their sole purpose is to gain control of the government to satisfy the selfish aspirations of their electoral following. A special place is occupied by the former liberals who are now fellow-travelers of the Communists, such as Tsouderos and General Plastiras. In practice the social influence of the political center is small, as it has lost its popular base. It has remained in place as the currents have swept popular allegiance to either left or right extreme.

Unanchored in between there remains Papandreou's Social-Democratic Party and former Premier Canellopoulos.

The people who follow the Communists are overwhelmingly the victims of a lively and simple optimism which makes them believe that, thanks to Soviet aid, the millenium will be reached at any moment. They are utterly oblivious to political and social realities. They are wedded

to the conviction that only by force can permanent socio-economic changes be wrought.

There is as present no popular Socialist movement in Greece. The problem of Greek labor is to build its own organization, distinct from and opposed to Communism, and to arouse the workers and artisans from their torpidity. This long-range task becomes a veritable Sisyphean assignment in an epoch of civil war, when blood and emotions reign and when utopias easily replace cool appraisal and reflection.

The problems of Greek labor and Socialism are complicated by the existence of the ELD, a "Socialist" party set up after the liberation and functioning as a complete tool of the Communists. It is their agent and show-piece. On every step, the ELD has followed the Communist leash. At its congress of 1946, incidentally, General-Secretary Tsirimokos extolled the Soviet Union and foresaw "immensely progressive" results from a "Russian expansion." Just as the Communists and the overt fellow-travelers of the Tsouderos-Plastiras type, the ELD boycotted the national elections. Its publication, *Machi,* abounds in attacks on the Marshall Plan, on the concept of the "third force," and on right-wing socialism of the Saragat type. Formerly, the ELD was part of the EAM coalition, and its chairman, Svolos, was president of EAM's political organizations in the liberated areas.

Among the other leftist groups one must mention the formerly trotskyite Archiomarxists, who of late have been undergoing a radical transformation into something approaching the Western conception of democratic socialism. There is also a Labor party, under the lucid and distinguished leadership of Georgiadis, the vetern Socialist.

There are also the Socialist Federation and ASO, a group of disgruntled former ELD adherents, but these are politically and organizationally ineffective, including capable intellectuals without a mass following and often motivated by sheer egotistic considerations. Except for the Labor Party, all these splinter movements are handicapped by the fact that they took part in the December uprising on the side of the EAM.

The creation of a labor movement in Greece will become a reality only when the consequences of war and occupation are overcome and normal economic life is restored. To that end, the masses who instinctively sided with the extreme left in their search for social justice must first become politically educated and replace adoration of force by democratic self-discipline and political consciousness.